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Abstract 
 
Climate change sceptics or ‘contrarians’ have been investigated thoroughly in 
the Anglo-American world. In Austria such an analysis has not been conducted 
to date. Starting with a narrow concept of climate change scepticism the idea is 
broadened, from actors who call the science of climate change into question to 
include actors who challenge climate change policy. It is argued, that if the goal 
of argumentation is to hinder regulations, then the arguments employed are 
contrarian. 
On the basis of this broadened concept of climate scepticism, two of the four 
pillars of the European climate and energy package, renewable energy and 
emissions trading – specifically their implementation in the Austrian national 
context – are analysed using an adapted version of Bas Arts method of 
triangulation, including document analysis and expert interviews. The 
investigation focuses specifically on the conflicts surrounding these policy 
measures, upon the actors involved, their channels of influence and the 
arguments employed. This is complemented by an analysis of interest politics in 
Austria from the perspective of structural (Offe) or strategic (Jessop) selectivity of 
the state. The analysis focuses specifically on the historical contingency of power 
of specific organisations and the consequences this has for climate policy. 
 
 
 
Klimaskeptiker wurden im angloamerikanischen Raum eingehend analysiert. 
Eine solche Analyse fehlt bislang für Österreich. Beginnend mit einer 
beschränkten Definition der Klimaskepsis wird der Begriff, der ursprünglich 
Akteure die die Klimawissenschaft in Frage stellen bezeichnet, um solche 
erweitert die die Klima(wandel)politik in Frage stellen. Wenn das Ziel einer 
Argumentation die Verhinderung effektiver Klimapolitik ist, dann sind die 
Argumente klimaskeptisch unabhängig davon ob sie Klimawissenschaft oder 
Klimapolitik in Frage stellen, so das Argument. 
Auf Basis dieser erweiterten Definition der Klimaskepsis, werden zwei der vier 
Säulen des Europäischen Klima- und Energie Pakets, erneuerbare Energien und 
Emissionshandel – speziell die Umsetzung in der nationalen Politik – analysiert. 
 0
Zur Analyse wird eine adaptierte Version des Zugangs der Triangulation von 
Dokumentenanalyse und ExpertInneninterviews von Bas Arts angewendet. Die 
Untersuchung behandelt insbesondere Konflikte in der Implementierung dieser 
Maßnahmen, die involvierten Akteure, deren Einflusskanäle und die 
eingesetzten Argumente. Diese Analyse wird durch einen staatstheoretischen 
Blickwinkel auf österreichische Interessenorganisationen aus der Perspektive 
der strukturellen (Offe) und strategischen (Jessop) Selektivität ergänzt. Hierbei 
liegt der Fokus auf der historischen Bedingtheit der Macht einiger 
Interessenorganisationen und die sich daraus ergebenden Konsequenzen für die 
Klimapolitik. 
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1. Introduction 
In the United States, climate change ‘contrarians’ and their influence on politics 
have been well documented (see chapter 2). In German speaking countries, 
individual climate scientists have devoted considerable time and energy to 
refuting the arguments of contrarians (i.e. Rahmstorf 2004) however the 
influence of such actors and their arguments on politics has thus far gone un-
investigated. The project CONTRA1 upon which this thesis is based and the 
thesis in particular aim, at least in part, to close this research gap with regard to 
Austria. 
Although contrarian arguments can be found in Austrian media every so often, 
they tend not to be voiced within institutionalized politics. A justified question 
then may be, upon what grounds should the influence of ‘contrarians’ on Austrian 
policy-making be analysed? One motivation behind this project was the fact that 
Austria, one of the world’s wealthiest countries, with a rich history of 
environmental action and significant potential for achieving climate mitigation 
action, is one of the European laggards concerning emission reduction targets 
within the Kyoto Protocol framework2. Given this seemingly conflicting situation, 
there seems good reason to assume that ‘contrarians’ manage to exert influence 
within the Austrian political system too. 
For the purpose of this analysis two aspects of climate policy in Austria have 
been selected. On the one hand emissions trading from an Austria-specific 
perspective will be analysed. The other subject matter investigated within this 
context is the green electricity act (GE-Act, German: Ökostromgesetz). Within 
emissions-trading, analysis will focus on the development of the two Austrian 
National Allocation Plans (NAP), for the first ETS trading period, 2005 – 2007 
                                            
1 This thesis is part of a multi-institutional and inter-disciplinary research project funded by the 
Austrian Climate and Energy Fund, entitled Contrarians - their role in the debate on climate-
change and their influence on the Austrian policy making process (CONTRA). The project itself 
concurrently follows several different but interconnected aims. On the one hand, several project 
partners aim to create a detailed and differentiated classification of the diverse ‘contrarian’ 
arguments which are voiced in many different contexts. Two further work packages within the 
project, are conducting a media analysis on climate change in German speaking print media and 
a network analysis of the different actors involved in climate politics – and as a result also 
‘contrarians’ – primarily in the German speaking realm, but also including international linkages. 
The work package upon which this thesis is based, aims to analyse the influence of ‘contrarians’ 
on the Austrian – and in a small comparative study also German – policy making process. A final 
aspect of the project takes a look at the ethical implications of climate scepticism, from a 
theological perspective.  
2http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=de&pcode=tsien010&
plugin=1 (accessed: 04.10.2011) 
 4
and for the Kyoto commitment period 2008-2012 on the one hand, and upon 
amendments to emissions trading for the post 2012 framework on the other (it 
should be noted at this stage, that the analysis soon made clear that for the third 
phase of EU emissions trading much decision-making competence has been 
transferred to the European level and as such this thesis has focussed primarily 
on the development of the NAPs and less on the 2011 amendment of the 
Emissions Certificate Act – EC-Act; German: Emissionszertifikategesetz or EZG 
– than was initially planned). In the context of renewable energy the 
amendments to the legal framework in 2006 and 2011 (Green electricity act 
20123) will be investigated. The reasoning behind this selection is that, on the 
one hand two of the three major issues within the EU climate and energy 
package 20084 are addressed (these being emissions reductions, renewable 
energy and energy efficiency5). On the other hand this material constitutes 
aspects of climate policy, which are both very visible and incur large costs for 
both industry and consumers. The choice of these policy areas was also 
confirmed in the context of the exploratory interviews (see Annex I) conducted at 
the beginning of this research. As will be discussed in detail in chapters 4 and 5, 
the aspects of the material which will be focused upon were constituted by 
diverse interests and conflicts over distribution of costs and as such, so the initial 
hypothesis, prone to the adoption of arguments in the sense of climate policy 
sceptics (to be discussed in chapter 2). 
 
1.1 Research Questions 
As the title of the project upon which this thesis is based suggests, the primary 
aim of this analysis is to investigate the influence ‘contrarians’ have on Austrian 
climate policy making. As will be discussed in chapter 2, the definition of 
‘contrarians’ in this case includes actors who employ argumentation of an 
economic nature to argue against the implementation of effective climate change 
mitigation policy. The underlying hypothesis is that actors will, on the whole, pay 
less attention to legislation without binding targets and focus upon policy where 
                                            
3 Although an amendment was originally planned, the changes were so significant that the 
Austrian legislature opted to create a new law (Ökostromgesetz 2012). 
4 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.htm (accessed: 14.10.2011) 
5 The fourth pillar or the climate and energy package is carbon capture and storage, but to date 
this is not attributed the weight of the other three policy areas. 
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large costs in implementation are incurred. In this regard, two aspects of Austrian 
climate policy – emissions trading and renewable energy as discussed in the 
introduction – have been identified, upon which the analysis will be based. 
The over arching question in this thesis – and the motivation for the underlying 
project as a whole – is why Austria is a European laggard on climate (Kyoto) 
policy. The aim of the thesis in this context is to look at the role of climate 
sceptics and their arguments in Austrian climate policy making. Determining 
influence however – particularly attributing a particular outcome in a complex 
system to a particular action on the part of a particular actor in the form of a 
cause-effect relationship is pretty much impossible. As Bas Arts states, „any 
quantitative or qualitative determination of political influence remains after all an 
informed guess“ (1998: 74, italics in original).  
Accordingly, the strategy pursued to operationalize the aim (formulated above) of 
this analysis is to identify conflicts surrounding the elements of climate policy 
discussed in the introduction, examine the arguments employed within these 
conflicts and the actors involved. Accordingly, the following questions are posed: 
 
 What are the central conflicts surrounding climate policy in Austria? 
 
 Which actors in Austria are involved in the conflicts identified? 
 
 Which formal and informal channels of influence are pursued by these 
actors? 
 
 Are ‘contrarian’ arguments employed, and if so which types of arguments 
and by whom? 
 
Through the analysis of the conflicts surrounding critical elements of climate 
policy as well as the actors involved and the arguments employed, the influence 
of certain actors and arguments upon these policy areas has been extrapolated. 
Within the expert interviews conducted, direct questions relating to the influence 
of certain actors on certain policy were asked, when and where appropriate. As 
such, a further question posed within this thesis is as follows: 
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 To what extent do actors employing ‘contrarian’ argumentation identified, 
manage to influence the Austrian policy-making process?  
 
As stated above, this analysis will focus upon two aspects of climate policy 
making in Austria. Although being far from exhaustive, the two case studies 
involve central and important parts of climate policy in Austria and, as such, will 
offer a comprehensive overview of the actors and conflicts therein. The analysis 
of climate sceptical actors and the arguments employed – specifically the 
analysis of arguments against climate policy – will provide a valuable and new 
contribution to the debate surrounding climate scepticism and the investigation 
there of.  
 
On the other hand, it should also be noted, that any analysis of influence also 
has certain limitations. Although such an analysis – if successful – will shed light 
on the question, if – in this case - climate sceptic actors managed to influence a 
particular political process, but not why they manage to do so. 
As such, this analysis aims to go beyond the mere investigation of influence and 
look at the selectivity of the Austrian state in the sense of Offe or Jessop (see 
chapter 1.3), in an attempt to explain why the state is responsive to certain 
interests and as a result, biased toward specific policies: 
 
 How can the influence of climate policy sceptics be explained? 
 
It is assumed that specific characteristics of the Austrian state – in particular 
corporatism – make it particularly responsive to certain interests. Through the 
case studies, this analysis aims to identify the manner in which corporatist actors 
are involved in the Austrian political system, where specific relationships 
between interest groups and government and the parliament exist, and how 
these actors are mutually interdependent. This analysis will be complemented by 
a review of relevant literature and dealt with separately in chapter 6. 
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1.2 Theoretical Approach 
The research questions in this thesis pose two theoretical challenges. On the 
one hand, quantifying the influence of actors requires a suitable definition and 
operationalisation, upon which influence can be assessed. However a mere 
analysis of influence would not require deeper investigation into the subject (the 
policy making process, in this particular case) upon which influence is being 
wielded. The policy-making process in this case is assumed to be neutral – a so-
called black box – that can be influenced.  
Explaining why specific actors possess the capacity to influence the policy-
making process, requires an analysis of the actors which constitute the policy 
making process, of the power relationships between them, and the particular way 
in which the (Austrian) state is constituted. 
 
A good starting point in relation to influence is the seminal dissertation of Bas 
Arts, who investigated the influence of NGOs on the climate and biodiversity 
conventions. Arts defines “’success’ in terms of political influence … as the 
achievement of one’s policy goals through one’s own, intended, intervention in … 
politics” (Arts 1998: 30). Going one step further he cites Huberts who states that 
“A player exercises political influence if his presence, thoughts or actions cause 
a political decision-maker to meet his interests or objectives more than would 
have been the case had this player been absent.” (1994: 39 cit. in Arts 1998: 
57f). This definition, however, refers to the influence of a specific actor on 
another specific actor, i.e. the decision-maker. For the purpose of Arts’ study, but 
also for this thesis, the point of interest is not specifically influence on a decision-
maker but on “the collective policy outcome” (Arts 1998: 58 italics added). Hence 
the definition of political influence focuses on the outcomes of policy-making, and 
“political influence is defined as the achievement of (a part of) one’s policy goal 
with regard to an outcome in treaty formation and implementation”6 (ibid). Hence 
the focus is on “product” rather than “process” influence (ibid 59). As such, 
“political influence implies that the policy outcome concerned is more in line with 
                                            
6 Here Arts definition is specific to the context he studied (i.e. the formulation of the climate and 
biodiversity conventions. For the purpose of this analysis, treaty formulation and implementation 
can be replaced with the material in question (i.e. the Austrian NAP 2008 – 2012, as well as the 
various amendments to the emissions certificate and renewable energy laws under investigation. 
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the policy goal of the player involved than would have been the case had the 
latter not intervened” (ibid). 
Binding the concept of influence to an effect makes it more precise, or easily 
measurable, as it implies an empirical change in condition (see Seifer 2009: 
117). As such the focal point changes from the influence of one actor on another, 
as defined by Huberts – as it is “nigh on impossible” to show direct “influence on 
decision makers in data” (ibid: 119, translation from the German original) – to 
influence on (the end product of) political processes. This makes sense, as 
influencing decision makers is clearly the means and not the end of lobbying or 
other strategies. To be able to measure influence, preferences of the actors in 
question need to be objectively condensed in the form of a concrete political 
agreement7 (see ibid). This definition of influence also aids the operationalisation 
of the concept because if “political influence is the implementation of preferences 
in the end result, then the preferences of the actors are an ideal indicator to 
determine the political influence” (ibid: 129). 
 
Arts approach is based upon an analysis conducted within a very particular 
setting – the Rio Earth Summit. In this condensed form of a political process, the 
preferences of actors under investigation – NGOs – were readily identifiable in 
the form of verbal communication (plenary statements and interviews) and 
written documentation (position papers, press releases, websites etc.) published 
in and around the conference. 
The material and actors under investigation in this context are different in several 
respects. On the one hand, parts of the policy-making under investigation took 
place several years back. Whereas statements made by NGOs tend to be fairly 
unequivocal, actors in the context of this analysis often purport to support 
legislation (some of which may be meant quite sincerely), but argue against 
specific targets, methods of allocation etc.  
Furthermore, preferences are also not available in written form (no statement 
made, but informal discussions with ministries held). As such, much is borrowed 
from Arts approach for the investigation of influence in the context of this thesis, 
in particular the idea of triangulation of document analysis and expert interviews 
with actors from ministries and parties as well as from interest groups 
                                            
7 Kathrin Seifer defines concrete political agreement as a treaty, strategic paper, statement of 
intent, or binding legislation. 
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themselves, to determine the influence of actors on the policy making, but the 
approach is adapted where appropriate or necessary. 
 
The approach described above can give an indication if certain actors have 
influenced certain policies. Such an influence-theoretical approach however is 
limited, as it cannot explain why certain actors manage to influence policy 
making, and why others do not. As such, definitions of influence need to be 
supplemented with the theoretical idea that “the success of influence exertion is 
structurally imbedded (i.e. in the systematic exclusion of all opposed interests)” 
(Offe 1980: 73, translation from German original). The selectivity referred to 
here, describes a sorting process based upon institutionalized rules of exclusion. 
For an operationalisation of this concept, one needs to determine what is being 
excluded, i.e. which “non-events” are taking place. Offe describes three types of 
non-events. Social-structural non-events, here the example of witch-burning is 
mentioned, are those where the preconditions for their taking place are just not 
present in modern industrialized societies. Every decision excludes other 
decisions, all of which could be referred to as non-events. This would overstretch 
the concept somewhat, so these are referred to as accidental non-events. 
Systemic non-events are those that arise directly from the organizational 
structure and processes of the political system and cannot be explained without 
making reference hereto (ibid: 74f). The concept of selectivity can thus be 
defined as the “non-coincidental (i.e. systematic) restriction of a space of 
possibility” (ibid: 78).  
To understand why possibilities are restricted, it is necessary to take a look at 
the concept of the state. Questions posed on this level ask what ‘the state’ is. If 
‘the state’ restricts certain possibilities, then clearly the conception of the state as 
an ‘autonomous’ actor or a collection of ‘neutral’ institutions has some short 
fallings. Starting with Poulantzas’s insight that the state is “a relationship of 
forces, or more precisely the material condensation of such a relationship” (1978: 
128f cit. in. Jessop 1999: 51), Jessop goes on to classify the state as 
strategically selective in the sense that it “reflects” but also “modifies the balance 
of class forces” (Jessop 1999: 51). Whilst negating any absolute political primacy 
of either class or capital fractions on the one hand and accepting that many 
different political strategies determine state policy on the other, Jessop makes 
the “pronouncement that the state will be more responsive to particular strategies 
 10
over others” (Kelly 1999: 111). In the words of Markus Wissen, the state is a 
conflict terrain but the “chances to gain access to, and successfully articulate 
interests in, this terrain (…) are very unequally distributed” (2011: 243, 
translation from the German original).  
As such, “policy is best understood as being moulded around particular 
hegemonic projects, as expressed mainly by dominant political parties, whose 
relationship to the dominant regime of accumulation is crucial” (Kelly 1999: 111f). 
When looking at the issue of climate policy, the arguments employed by actors 
threatened by such policy (primarily businesses in the industrial and power 
generating sectors, who employ large numbers of people) - it will be 
demonstrated - are so successful because they adhere to and utilize the 
dominant economic paradigm of growth and competition, precisely the paradigm 
which has created the problem of climate change. Governments tend only to be 
elected if they support the dominant paradigm and if they are to survive must 
reinforce and bow to that same paradigm. As such, “business interests are able 
to threaten that, unless government listens to them, their sector will not be 
successful, which will in turn jeopardize government’s own core concern with 
economic success” (Crouch 2004: 18).  
 
1.3 Methods 
The methodological approach of this thesis is three fold. On the one hand, much 
insight is gained through a review of existing literature. On the other hand, 
primary sources are also used. In terms of the legislation that is examined, 
document analysis is applied to legal texts in the form of ministry drafts, 
government proposals and final legislation as well as EU decisions. Furthermore, 
written opinions of stakeholders within the Austrian legislative framework have 
been consulted. A substantial part of the data collection was also carried out in 
the form of expert interviews. These were used to corroborate information 
gleaned from the document analysis, but also contributed substantially to the 
insights gained in their own right. 
 
Expert interviews can be used either as part of a mix of methods, as was the 
case here, or as a stand-alone means of collecting data (see Meuser/Nagel 
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1991: 441). A central issue when using the method of expert interviews is the 
definition of who can be considered an expert. What Meuser and Nagel make 
clear is that the term expert is not defined in terms of academic qualities or as 
some sort of consultant but that expert is a wholly relational term (see ibid: 443). 
An expert in relation to a particular subject matter is someone who is part of the 
subject matter being investigated. This means they are either responsible for 
happenings within the field being researched or have privileged access to 
information about people or decision-making processes (see ibid).  
As such, experts are people who have a function within the “organisational or 
institutional context” (ibid: 444, translation from the German original) under 
investigation and whose tasks and responsibilities provide exclusive experience 
and information. A point made by Meuser and Nagel in this context which is 
particularly relevant to the interviews conducted within this thesis is that these 
people are often not in the top level of their respective organisation, but on the 
second or third level, these being the levels “where decisions are prepared and 
implemented” (ibid: 443). Taking the example of government ministries, this 
would mean conducting interviews with heads of departments or sections as 
opposed to interviewing ministers or state secretaries (ibid: 444). These can be 
considered the ‘corridors of power’ when it comes to the fate of a directive, as 
demonstrated by Meuser (1989 cit. in Meuser/Nagel 1991: 444).  
Besides defining the role of ‘expert’, Meuser and Nagel also differentiate the role 
of expert interviews between those that take in a central role within the research 
process and expert interviews that are rather more peripheral to research. A 
common example of the latter function of expert interviews is their use during the 
explorative phase of a research project, where they provide “additional 
information such as background knowledge or eye-witness accounts and 
illustrate and annotate the researcher’s propositions” (ibid: 445). 
In cases where expert interviews are central to the research process, Meuser 
and Nagel differentiate between experts who are the actual target group of the 
investigation, i.e. the group to be investigated, and experts who are 
complementary to the target group and can give information on the context of the 
action of the target group (see ibid).  
In the case of this research, expert interviews were conducted with various 
actors at different stages. Over the course of all the interviews conducted, all 
three of the groups identified by Meuser and Nagel described above were 
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covered at some stage. During the preliminary phase of the research for this 
thesis, three exploratory interviews (for consolidated findings see Annex I) were 
conducted with representatives of Denkstatt, an Austrian think-tank, the Austrian 
Green Party and Greenpeace. The function of these interviews, as identified by 
Meuser and Nagel and described above, was to gain new and additional 
information on the field of research, concerning the policies and actors to be 
investigated and to supplement and confirm existing knowledge and that gleaned 
during the preliminary literature review. 
During the main research phase eight expert interviews were conducted. As one 
interview partner wished to remain anonymous, the interviews have been 
numbered and are not listed in the annex to this thesis. At certain stages in the 
analysis it becomes clear which organisation the interview partner in question 
represents. This was only done in the cases were anonymity was not requested. 
At no stage in the analysis are any interview partners mentioned by name.  
The interviews were carried out with members of interest representation 
organisations –Chamber of Commerce, Chamber of Labour, Federation of Trade 
Unions and the Federation of Industry. Based on insights gained from the initial 
review of the literature (see i.e. Tálos 2001 below) and the exploratory interviews 
conducted (see above), these actors clearly fall into the category of the target 
group. 
In addition, interviews were also conducted with representatives from the Federal 
Ministry for Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water8, the Federal Ministry 
of Commerce, Family and Youth9, the Social Democratic Party and an Austrian 
federal state (a representative with a coordinating role for Austrian federal states 
on related questions). In these cases the classification of the actors interviewed 
is not quite so straightforward as they are, to differing extents, involved in the 
policy making process and as such, clearly a part of the target group, but also 
offering insights on the role and activity of other actors such as the interest 
representational organisations, mentioned above, giving them more of a 
complimentary role. 
This differentiation clearly has significant implications for the questions posed. 
The group of organisations, classified as the target group above, were asked 
primarily about their involvement in the various legislative and other policy 
                                            
8 short: Ministry of Environment 
9 short: Ministry of Commerce  
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making processes, their interaction with legislative and executive actors and their 
strategies for successfully fulfilling their respective mandate. The group of actors 
whose role was more ambivalent, i.e. fell into both groups, were also asked 
about their respective roles in Austrian climate policy making, although the focus 
of the interviews soon changed to questions concerning the target group and 
other potentially relevant actors (such as individual companies) and their 
respective involvement.  
 
The interviews themselves were semi-structured guideline interviews. This gave 
the interview situation enough structure to ensure that the important questions of 
interest were answered, but left them open enough to allow the interview partner 
to “structure the subject-matter themselves and introduce their respective 
assessment” (Meuser/Nagel 1991: 442 drawing upon insights from Dexter 1970: 
5ff). This also had significant (positive) consequences for the research process 
as several new insights were gleaned during the interviews conducted (such as 
the crucial importance of the studies conducted prior to the drawing up of the first 
Austrian NAP, see chapter 4.2.1). 
 
The interviews were analysed using the method of structuring as defined by 
Mayring (2010). This method of analysis is comparably simplistic and does not 
rely on complex techniques such as analysis of semantics. The goal of “content 
structuring is to filter out and summarize particular themes, contents and aspects 
from the material” (Mayring 2010: 98). These themes can either be pre-defined 
and theory driven, i.e. deductive, or gleaned from the material itself, i.e. 
inductive. Although the material was approached with pre-formulated categories, 
these categories were in part re-defined or re-invented during the analysis. New 
themes and categories, which evolved during the course of the analysis, were 
identified on the basis of repetition, particular use of language (strong/emotional 
formulation and analogies or metaphors, which were common in some of the 
interviews conducted) as well as similarities but particularly differences in 
perspective of interview partners on the same issue (see also Bernard/Ryan 
2010: 53ff).  
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1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 elaborates the term climate 
change sceptic or ‘contrarian’. In the course of this chapter several examples of 
such actors from the United States are presented. Furthermore the phenomenon 
of climate change is placed in the context of the ‘bigger picture’ of neo-liberal 
capitalism. Conclusions on the consequences for the analysis in the Austrian 
political framework are then drawn.  
Chapter 3 provides a definition of what is meant by climate policy (and what is 
not) and briefly describe climate policy in the EU and Austria. In this framework 
the actors involved in decision making and the legislative process are outlined.  
Chapter 4 forms the first of the two main empirical chapters. In this chapter, the 
concept of emissions trading is introduced and outlined on the multilateral UN, 
the EU and the Austrian national levels. The analysis then goes on to focus upon 
the development of the National Allocation Plans for the EU Emissions Trading 
System periods I (2005 – 2007) and II (2008 – 2012) and the conflicts involved. 
The development of the 2011 amendment to the Emissions Certificate Act, 
passed in preparation for the third trading period starting in 2013 is also touched 
upon briefly. 
Chapter 5 introduces the topic of renewable energy and the legislative 
framework on both the EU and Austrian levels. The analysis then turns to the 
2006 amendment of the Green Electricity Act, where the support landscape was 
considerably restricted with a resulting stagnation in renewable energy 
production in Austria. This is complemented with an investigation of the 2011 
amendment to the act, where support was increased in light of 2020 
commitments made on the European level.  
In Chapter 6 an attempt is made to explain the influence of interest organisations 
on the legislative framework identified in the previous two chapters. It is argued 
that the power of these organisations is historically contingent to the specific 
political developments in Austria post WW II and that these developments 
contribute significantly to the specific selectivity of the Austrian state and the 
access hereto of particular interests, as outlined in the theoretical approach in 
chapter 1.2.  
Finally in the concluding chapter, Chapter 7, the analysis and the arguments are 
recapitulated and the outlook outlined. 
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2 Climate Scepticism – Definition and Debate 
At this stage it is important and necessary to give an overview of climate 
scepticism and undertake a definition of what is meant by climate sceptics or 
‘contrarians’. Clearly healthy scepticism is essential to the progression of 
science. Scepticism, in fact, is integrated into the day-to-day workings of science 
in the form of the peer review process, for example, where scientists subject their 
work to critical scrutiny by their peers. 
However, scepticism, but also contrarianism or denialism (all terms which have 
been applied in this context) becomes problematic when voiced with an intention 
other than that of constructively contributing to the debate. Often, supposedly 
scientific work is published in popular or popular-scientific media (see, for 
example, Dr. Robert Carter10) and/or published by scientists of a different 
academic background to the discipline they purport to be working in. 
That some actors who deny the consensus opinion on climate change11 have an 
agenda of a different nature has been repeatedly proven within the US context 
(see Gelbspan 1997; Hoggon 2009; Oreskes/Conway 2009). In the case of the 
United States and to a lesser extent the UK – which stand in contrast to Austria – 
‘contrarians’ openly deny the findings of climate science and attempt to call into 
question the individual scientists and/or scientific institutions concerned with 
climate change (the most prominent example of which is the so-called ‘climate 
gate’ affair at the East Anglia Climatic Research Unit in the UK, prior to the 
Copenhagen climate conference in 2009). To illustrate the debate in the United 
                                            
10 Of Dr. Carter’s 130 total publications, five obviously call the science which points to the 
evidence of anthropogenic climate change into question. None of these five publications appear 
in journals appearing in the ISI list, even though the majority of his other journal publications are 
highly regarded ISI listed publications (i.e. Marine Geology, Australian Journal of Earth Sciences, 
Sedimentary Geology etc). Furthermore, four of these five publications appear in (non ISI listed) 
economics journals (the fifth is from conference proceedings). A final conspicuous point, is that 
Dr. Carter, a natural scientist, who on the whole never publishes in economic media, publishes 
80% of the papers written by him on rebuffing a consensus natural science opinion (see Oreskes 
2004: 1686 for a list of public and scientific institutions agreeing on anthropogenic climate 
change) in social-sciences journals. Dr. Carter’s bibliography: 
http://members.iinet.net.au/~glrmc/new_page_4.htm (accessed: 10.02.2012) 
11 In an article in Science, Oreskes analyzed 928 papers listed in the ISI database with the 
keywords ‘climate change’. Not one of these papers disagreed with the consensus opinion as 
voiced by the American Meteorological Association, the American Geophysical Union or the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science and many others. In conclusion, Oreskes 
states: “This analysis shows that scientists publishing in the peer-reviewed literature agree with 
IPCC, the National Academy of Sciences, and the public statements of their professional 
societies. Politicians, economists, journalists, and others may have the impression of confusion, 
disagreement, or discord among climate scientists, but that impression is incorrect.” (Oreskes 
2004: 1686). 
 16
States, several examples cited by the authors (mentioned above), are presented 
below (it should be emphasized that this depiction is of an illustrative nature and 
by no means claim to cover the totality of the arguments or tactics employed).  
 
2.1 Examples from the United States 
One of the primary strategies of ‘contrarians’ – not only in the United States – 
has been to influence the debate in the media. The motivation behind these 
tactics is clear. Media play a large part in shaping public opinion which, once 
influenced, can be a major factor in steering political debate and as a result, 
political majorities. In this context, Naomi Oreskes12, makes reference to Ben 
Santer, convening lead-author of chapter eight of the 2nd IPCC Assessment 
Report (SAR). After the SAR was published in 1995, Fred Seitz wrote an article 
in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) accusing Santer of “unauthorized changes” and 
of downplaying uncertainties, under the title of “A major deception on global 
warming”. Santer responded that changes had been made, but that these 
changes were in response to the peer review process. All 40 of his co-authors, 
the president of the IPCC and the president of the WMO signed his letter. 
Sections of this letter as well as many signatories were omitted by the WSJ when 
it was published. 
 
The question, which arises in this context, is why the media publish opinions, 
which stand in contradiction to the consensus scientific opinion? In this respect 
Boykoff and Boykoff found an interesting answer. In reference to the Bush 
Administration’s call for a decade of research before taking action, they speak of 
a “spectacular culmination of a complex and perpetually unfolding discursive 
process propagated by the prestige press in the United States.” (Boykoff/Boykoff 
2004: 125). Adhering to the norm of balanced reporting, journalists have caused 
“popular discourse” to diverge significantly from “scientific discourse” (ibid: 125f). 
As such mass media has offered “a voluble minority view” (Adger et. al. 2001: 
707, cit. in ibid: 126) which argues the scientific uncertainty surrounding climate 
science. As the authors conclude, “balanced coverage does not, of course, 
always mean accurate coverage” (Boykoff/Boykoff 2004: 126). In this case 
                                            
12 Oreskes presented this in a lecture entitled The American Denial of Global Warming. Available 
online: http://www.uctv.tv/search-details.aspx?showID=13459 (accessed: 15.03.2011) 
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balanced reporting leads to an “informational bias” (ibid), which “has allowed a 
small group of global warming sceptics to have their views amplified” (ibid: 127). 
The problem is that “journalists present competing points of views on a scientific 
question as though they had equal scientific weight.” (ibid, italics added). Over 
80% of the articles analysed presented both sides of the debate. Over 50% gave 
“roughly equal attention to the view that humans were contributing to global 
warming, and the other view that exclusively natural fluctuations could explain 
the earth’s temperature increase.” (ibid: 129). 
 
In his book, Climate Cover-Up, Hoggon describes the role of think tanks in the 
contrarian debate. Here he describes a letter which surfaced written by Kenneth 
Green from the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), offering scientists $10,000 to 
write a critique of the 4th IPCC Assessment Report (FAR). The AEI received most 
of it’s funding from Exxon mobile, the largest oil corporation in the world. Another 
example is the ‘Independent Summary for Policy Makers’ released by the Fraser 
Institute (FI). Exxon also funds the FI. The primary aim of this report was to 
shroud the FAR in uncertainty pointing to the uncertainty (less than 5%) that 
climate change is anthropogenic in nature.  
 
Whether ‘contrarians’ attempt to purchase scientific opinion, or make claims in 
popular media, they have clearly managed to influence the political debate in the 
US, as the following examples demonstrate. In May 1996, when discussing the 
budget for the NASA program on climate monitoring, which had previously 
received full backing by the National Research Council, Congressman Walker, 
then chairman of the House Science Committee “successfully recommended 
cutting the funding for the program”, citing “the Marshall Institute’s denials of the 
climate crisis to justify his decision.” (Gelbspan 1997: 4). 
Also in the political context, Oreskes makes an interesting reference to Senator 
James Inhofe who, during a speech to Congress in July 2003 described global 
warming as “the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American people” (cit. in 
Oreskes/Conway 2010: 213). Further investigation reveals interesting facts about 
Senator Inhofe. In a speech made in January 2005 Inhofe, as then chairman of 
the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, makes multiple 
references to the author Michael Crighton and his book, State of Fear, ending his 
speech with the following statement: “Despite the bias, omissions, and 
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distortions by the media and extremist groups, the real story about global 
warming is being told, and, judging by the welcome success of Michael 
Crichton's ‘State of Fear’, it's now being told to the American public.”13 
 
2.2 The bigger picture 
To explain these and other examples, climate change scepticism/denialism 
needs to be placed within its larger, socio-political and socio-historical context. 
What is meant by this is that the calling-into-question or blatant denial of climate 
change is not a means to an end in itself but is part of a larger neo-liberal project. 
Although in many cases climate change mitigation directly challenges the 
economic basis of certain actors (the most obvious case being companies 
directly involved in the production of fossil fuels), often time’s challenges to 
climate change and the underlying science have a far broader basis. In the 
words of Dunlap and McCright (2011) “climate change denial can be seen as 
part of a more sweeping effort to defend the modern Western social order 
(Jacques 2006), which has been built by an industrial capitalism powered by 
fossil fuels (Clark and York 2005). Since anthropogenic climate change is a 
major unintended consequence of fossil fuel use, simply acknowledging its 
reality poses a fundamental critique of the industrial capitalist economic system 
(…) By directing societal attention to environmental disasters like massive oil 
spills and crescive problems like climate change that result from economic 
production, the forces of reflexivity draw the ire of defenders of the capitalist 
system who often mobilize against them” (144f).  
Precisely as identified by Dunlap and McCright (above), Plehwe and Müller also 
state that much lobbying goes beyond specific interests and takes place in the 
context of winning a larger “war of ideas” (ibid: 149 & Plehwe/Müller 2008: s.p.). 
The mobilization of “defenders of the capitalist system” which is referred to 
above forms a part of such a war. Plehwe and Walpen in their analysis, situate 
the rise of neo-liberalism in a broader historical context as part of a well-
organized, long-term project which originated after the second world war in the 
form of the Mont Pélerin Society (2006: 27ff). Many efforts of this broader 
movement have been put into the production and dissemination of neo-liberal 
                                            
13 http://inhofe.senate.gov/pressreleases/climateupdate.htm  (accessed: 18.03.2011) 
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ideas, to which climate change scepticism/denial forms a natural consequence or 
progression and is conducted by many of the same conservative and/or free-
market think-tanks which have been instrumental in arguing for de-regulation of 
all kinds (ibid: 29ff, Plehwe/Müller 2008: s.p. or Dunlap/McCright in relation to, 
i.a. the Heritage Foundation, 2011: 149). The strength and success of this 
community „derives not from the highly visible and publicly acknowledged 
experts in politics or science“ but from the whole network which spans 
„academia, business, politics and media“ (Plehwe/Walpen 2006: 39).  
 
2.3 Consequences for analysis in the Austrian framework 
These insights are interesting when considered in the Austrian context. One 
organisation in Austria, the Hayek Institute, which openly denies the science of 
climate change – although not attributed much political weight in the interviews 
conducted in the framework of this thesis on the one hand and also not primarily 
concerned with climate change denial on the other – is focused upon upholding 
free-marked capitalism with as little government intervention as possible. As 
such it fits perfectly into the definition of Jacques et. al. (2008) of conservative 
think-tanks, as discussed by Dunlap and McCright (2011), as sharing “a 
universal commitment to free enterprise, limited government, and the promotion 
of unfettered economic growth” (149).  
These insights also clearly have consequences for the argumentation which can 
be considered contrarian. What McCright and Dunlap (2011) have said about 
different arguments challenging the science of climate change – “while the 
claims of these actors sometimes differ and evolve over time (there’s no 
warming, it’s not caused by humans, it won’t be harmful, etc.), the theme of ‘no 
need for regulations’ remains constant” (144) – can also be applied to challenges 
to climate change mitigation policy. As such, it can be argued that if the goal of 
the argument is ‘no need for regulations’ then it does not actually matter whether 
the science or the policy is being called into question, the argumentation is 
contrarian. 
As stated earlier, arguments challenging the science of climate change – as they 
are found in the US/UK – are seldom voiced in Austria. Here, the far more 
common line of argument is to present arguments against climate policy. In this 
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context, it is important to differentiate between “climate science sceptics” and 
“climate policy sceptics” (Brunnengräber 2011: s.p., italics added).  
In Austria the debate on climate change and climate change policy is 
characterized primarily by economic arguments. As such, climate policy sceptics 
as opposed to climate science sceptics, play a central role. Anthropogenic 
climate change is not called into question – the tendency is to point to the costs 
of i.e. emission reductions. The debate takes the form of a classical distributional 
conflict, involving different, heterogeneous interests. In this context, Tim Nuthall 
has coined the term „climate realism“. Nuthall makes reference to lobbyists in 
Brussels, who base their arguments on statements such as “carbon leakage”, 
“threats to jobs”, “increased costs” or “unnecessary burden” (Nuthall 2011: 11).  
As such, this investigation will be based primarily on such economic arguments, 
in the sense of climate policy sceptics. This implies an extension of the term 
‘contrarians’, which has generally been used to refer to actors who call climate 
science into question. As discussed earlier, political analysis of ‘contrarian’ lines 
of argument in the US, have tended to focus on ‘classical’ science sceptical 
arguments. Due to the fact that such arguments are seldom employed in a 
political context in Austria, it is necessary to examine climate policy scepticism 
and the economic lines of argument employed by such sceptics. Actors in 
German speaking countries, who endeavour to counter ‘contrarian’ positions, 
have tended to focus on arguments, which deny the findings of climate science 
(see e.g. Rahmstorf 2004 or Matschullat 2010). The economic arguments, as 
employed by climate policy sceptics, due to the fact that they are generally 
exercised in the political arena (where they are trying to mitigate effective climate 
policy, or rather the costs these incur) as opposed to climate science sceptical 
argumentation which is often published in pseudo-scientific literature, have thus 
far been seldom examined in a scientific context. This is not to say that such 
argumentation has not been classified. The online platform, Skeptical Science, 
which is i.a. concerned with countering ‘contrarian’ arguments, also includes 
examples such as „CO2 limits will harm the economy“, „Renewable energy 
investment kills jobs“ or „CO2 limits will make little difference“14 in its taxonomy of 
arguments. Furthermore, a classification produced within the project CONTRA, 
also deals with these arguments (see Annex II).  
                                            
14 See http://www.skepticalscience.com/argument.php?f=taxonomy (accessed: 20.03.2011).  
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One of the arguments identified within this classification, the so-called policy 
sceptic III, is that mitigation only makes sense on a global scale. At first glance 
this statement seems fairly harmless. The major forum for addressing the issue 
of climate change is the UN Framework Convention (UNFCCC) which embodies 
international multilateralism. Furthermore, most would also all agree that climate 
change is a global problem which requires a global solution. Where such an 
argument becomes problematic, is when it is employed to hinder or question 
national level action – action which can take place quite independently of other 
action and still has a positive effect on many levels – in the absence of a binding 
global agreement. An example of such argumentation, to illustrate, was 
employed by one of the interview partners interviewed in the course of this 
research who stated in relation to a strategy paper published by his organisation 
that: “the first premise was that both energy problems and climate change have a 
global dimension. This means that I need to address the problems globally. 
When I address them globally, this prohibits me in advance from putting my 
focus on the national domain and I have to focus on the global domain.”  
(Interview 5: 1, translated from German original15). 
Within the complex terrain of climate change and climate change policy where 
numerous, heterogeneous interests – ranging from re-election, profits, image, 
idealism and many more – are at stake, the arguments regarding the science of 
climate change and those for and against various policies are numerous and 
diverse. For the analysis conducted within the framework of this thesis, it is 
important to note that the term ‘contrarian’ and the arguments employed by 
actors subsumed under the concept, is kept deliberately broad so as to include 
the economic arguments used to argue against climate policy and as such 
support the position of ‘no need for regulations’. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
15 All further quotations from interviews are also translated from the German original, although  
Not explicitly stated.  
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3 Climate Policy  
The policy areas under investigation in this thesis are emissions trading and 
renewable energy. These are two aspects of a whole range of policy areas 
encompassed by climate policy in the EU and in Austria. The aim of this chapter 
is to give a brief overview of climate policy in Austria and the EU as a whole, to 
situate the two policy instruments under consideration within this complex and to 
give an introduction to the actors involved and the concrete legislative process 
within which such policy is formulated (primarily on the Austrian national level). 
This will form the basis for the empirical analysis of the two policy instruments in 
the following two chapters. However, before turning to climate policy in the 
European Union it is important to define what is meant by climate policy. 
Climate policy is understood to be the sum-collective of measures undertaken by 
political entities (local, regional or national governments, supra-national 
institutions, and multi-lateral international organisations) to mitigate the effects of 
anthropogenic climate change. Anthropogenic contributions to climate change 
come from the emission of greenhouse gases through the combustion of fossil 
fuels and land-use change (Rahmstorf 2011). Climate policy also includes 
measures being put in place or being planned to adapt to (as opposed to 
mitigate) the effects of climate change. Adaptation will however not be described 
in any more detail here, as the policy measures under scrutiny in this thesis fall 
under the category of policy aimed to mitigate the effects of climate change. 
As such, climate policy can be characterized as measures that aim to reduce the 
use of fossil fuels and combat land-use change. Such measures range, inter-alia, 
from economic incentives in the form of taxes or cap-and-trade systems, to the 
refurbishment of buildings to increase energy efficiency, the replacement of fossil 
fuels with renewable energy sources to reforestation programs. As such climate 
policy impinges upon many policy areas ranging, inter-alia, from energy and 
transportation to forestry and agriculture.  
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3.1 EU 
An analysis of national level climate policy must be complemented by or at least 
placed within the context of EU policy. The reason for this is of a legal nature, as 
much national-level legislation in these policy areas (as in many others) is the 
translation of EU legislation into national law and as such, national legislation 
cannot be understood without a view of the broader legal framework. The EU of 
today – legally embodied through the Treaty of Lisbon – regulates environment16 
(article 191 - 193) and as such climate, which is governed by the ordinary 
legislative procedure (former co-decision procedure of the European Parliament 
and the Council) as part of the Union’s key competences (see Council of the 
European Union 2008: 173ff)17.  
The challenge of climate change has seen the EU increasingly play the role of 
“environmental union” (Kahl 2009: 23) – as well as economic, monetary or 
energy union – a development expressed in the climate and energy package of 
2008 and the so-called 20-20-20 targets18. These are a 20% reduction in 
emissions; a 20% increase in energy efficiency (both in relation to 1990 levels) 
and 20% share of renewable energy by 2020. The bundling of these legal 
frameworks is a response to the necessity of addressing various, related policy 
areas in an integrated framework, whereby the effectiveness of collective (EU) 
action is considerably higher than individual (member state) approaches (see 
Geden/Fischer 2008: 68). The legal implementation of the main aspects of the 
climate and energy package has been realized via four European legislative 
acts: 
 
 Decision 406/2009/EC: “on the effort of Member States to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community’s greenhouse gas 
emission reduction commitments up to 2020” (European Union 2009a) 
 Directive 2009/28/EC: “on the promotion of the use of energy from 
renewable sources” (European Union 2009b) 
 Directive 2009/29/EC: “to improve and extend the greenhouse gas 
emission allowance trading scheme of the Community” (European Union 
2009c) 
                                            
16 Including climate change 
17 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Titles XX and XXI, Articles 191 – 194 
18 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.htm (accessed 14.11.2011) 
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 Directive 2009/31/EC: “on the geological storage of carbon dioxide” 
(European Union 2009d) 
 
The second and third of the legal acts listed regulate the policy areas of 
emissions trading and renewable energy. For the context of this thesis, however, 
the following should be noted: directive 2009/28/EC is a modification of directive 
2001/77/EC. The latter comprises the EU-level legal framework for the original 
legal text of the Austrian act as well as the first amendment under consideration 
here (2006), whereas the modified version of the directive regulates the 2011 
amendment of the law.  
A similar situation exists in the case of emissions trading. The NAPs were 
implemented under the legal auspices of the original ETS directive (2003/87/EC), 
whereas the 2011 amendment of the law on emissions certificates was prompted 
by the current directive (2009/29/EC) which regulates the trading period from 
2013 onwards.  
 
3.2 Austria 
Climate policy in Austria can be traced back to non-binding commitments 
(reduction in CO2 emissions of 20% by 2005 in relation to 1988 levels) in the 
framework of the World Conference on the Changing Atmosphere in 1988 (Hackl 
2000: 19).  
On a national level early legal acts concerning climate included the clean air act 
(Luftreinhaltegesetz) which was passed in 1988 and a law on smog 
(Smogalarmgesetz) which was passed in 1989, both of which have been 
modified to include ozone (Ozongesetz 1992) and other greenhouse gases 
(Immissionsschutzgesetz 1997) respectively.  
On an international level Austria was represented in the UN General Assembly 
for the constitution of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 
1988 and is a signatory to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), signed in 1992. Within this framework, Austria is also a signatory to 
the Kyoto Protocol (1997) within the EU commitment of a collective emissions 
reduction target of 8% in the years 2008 - 2012 (the so-called commitment 
period) in relation to 1990 levels (UN 1997). Within the so-called burden-sharing 
agreement of the EU, Austria is committed to reduce its greenhouse gas 
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emissions by 13% during the commitment period in relation to 1990 levels 
(European Council 2002).  
Since the Austrian accession to the EU in 1995, the majority of environmental 
(climate) policy making on a national level has been the implementation of EU 
legislation. Depending on their form and content these legislative acts allow for 
greater or lesser leeway in implementation (as will be seen within the analysis in 
chapters 4 and 5). Over the past decade Austria has enacted and modified a 
climate strategy (2002 and 2007) and implemented legal acts on inter-alia 
renewable energy, energy efficiency, emissions trading (all of which represent 
the conversion of EU legislation to national law) and compiled two NAPs within 
the EU-ETS framework. In 2011, existing legislation on renewable energy and 
emissions trading was modified to include directives passed as part of the EU 
climate and energy package (see above) and a law on climate protection 
(Klimaschutzgesetz) was enacted. The latter will not be discussed in the 
framework of this thesis – the two former legislative acts will inter alia form the 
subject of the subsequent two chapters. 
 
3.2.1 Actors 
Climate policy, due to its broad and encompassing nature, involves a large 
number of heterogeneous actors. For the purpose of this analysis it seems 
expedient to differentiate (roughly) between actors involved in creating 
(legislative) and implementing (executive) climate policy, i.e. the parliament, 
political parties, federal ministries, federal states and on a supra-national level 
the EU (although this analysis will focus primarily on the Austrian national level) 
and actors who are also (formally and informally) involved in this process but are 
also affected by such policy, i.e. trade and industry interest groups, business 
(whereby the focus is primarily on the former, collective expression of interest) 
and of course consumers (although this group of actors only play a role in this 
analysis, insofar as their body of interest representation, the Chamber of Labour, 
is analyzed). This differentiation is rough and incomplete. Climate policy making 
also encompasses other groups such as NGOs and science. However for the 
purpose of simplification, this analysis focuses on the ‘major’ actors as identified 
in the preliminary analysis (see exploratory interviews, Annex I).  
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On the climate policy-making level, the primary actors in Austria are the Ministry 
of Commerce and the Ministry of Environment. The former deals i.a. with energy 
policy and as such energy efficiency and renewable energy and the latter deals 
i.a. with emissions trading. In the context of these policies, the enacting ministry 
must consult with and also requires the agreement of the other. Of course other 
ministries, such as transport and infrastructure, but also finance and the federal 
chancellery play a role in climate policy making, but the primary ministries 
involved in the material analyzed in the context of this thesis are the two 
mentioned above.  
The political parties and the parliament also play a role in policy-making, 
although the conclusions reached in the exploratory interviews conducted, 
suggested that draft bills tend to arrive in parliament at quite a late stage and that 
parliamentary committees are used less for actual substantial debate and more 
to bargain for majorities. Particularly in the case of climate policy making, where 
the material under discussion is of a highly complex, technical nature, concrete 
formulation takes place prior to the parliamentary process. As such, quite few 
substantial changes actually take place in parliament (this assessment was 
corroborated in a later interview conducted with the energy representative from 
the Social Democratic Party19). As will be shown with the Green Electricity Act 
2012 (chapter 5) this is not always the case.  
 
Of particular standing in Austria and heavily involved in policy-making on almost 
every level are the social partners (see chapter 6 for more detail) and the 
Federation of Industry. These are the primary interest representation 
organisations for businesses and consumers in Austria. As such, these are also 
the actors who are negatively ‘affected’ by climate policy, in the sense that they 
represent consumers and businesses who have to carry the costs of such 
measures. In the case of renewable energy, both businesses and consumers are 
faced with an extra charge on their electricity which goes toward financial 
support measures such as feed-in tariffs. In the case of emissions trading, 
businesses falling under the EU ETS (and on an indirect level, the employees of 
these companies, represented by the trade unions) are obliged to submit 
emissions certificates corresponding to the amount of emissions measured in a 
                                            
19 Interview conducted with MP Wolfgang Katzian on February 24th 2012, not yet transcribed 
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calendar year. When the emissions exceed the permits given to the installations 
free of charge these are obliged to purchase certificates (see chapter 4 for more 
detail).  
These actors also play a significant role in the Austrian policy-making process 
(as described below). What is particularly unique in the case of climate policy 
making is that these actors who are normally in opposition to one another 
(employees and employers associations) in many cases form a united front (see 
in particular chapter 5.2.1) adding to their already existing, considerable political 
weight.  
The actors in question are the Chamber of Labour, the Chamber of Commerce, 
the Federation of Trade Unions and the Federation of Industry (the Chamber of 
Agriculture, although forming an integral part of the social partnership historically, 
is not active in emissions trading and has taken a different stance to the other 
organisations on renewable energy issues. As this analysis focuses primarily on 
actors opposed to progressive climate/renewable energy policy, the Chamber of 
Agriculture does not play a central role).  
The three former organisations are formally involved in the political process in 
the form of the social partnership. Although the latter is not formally a part of 
many of these institutionalized mechanisms of decision making and cooperation, 
the Federation of Industry de facto enjoys the same privileges (see below and in 
particular chapter 6).  
What makes these actors so powerful however, is not so much their formal 
involvement in the political process but the informal role these organisations play 
and the intense inter-dependence and intertwined nature of their relationships to 
the (major) political parties, the parliament and government. This status is 
something unique to the Austrian political system and a factor which emerged 
from the post WW II rebuilding process (see chapter 6).  
 
3.2.2 Legislative Process 
The actors mentioned above are involved in the political system and the 
legislative process in different ways. The legislative and executive actors are 
directly involved in the legal process, albeit with differing degrees of power. 
Of particular interest and relevance for this analysis is the involvement in climate 
policy of actors particularly affected by such policy. Traditionally the social 
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partnership, and more recently the Federation of Industry, have a privileged 
position, although it is important to differentiate between formal and informal 
involvement in the legislative process, as has been mentioned. On the whole 
there are four means of legislative initiative in Austria: through members of 
parliament, through the government in the form of a government bill passed by 
the council of ministers, through the upper house or through a referendum. The 
majority of initiatives are government bills (see Tálos/Kittel 2001: 38). 
In the case of certain government bills, there is an obligation to obtain comments 
from various actors (including the social partnership) not, however, to include 
them. In any case, interests are often articulated outside of the formally defined 
channels: “The influence of the chambers and unions has only a weak legal, but 
a strong political basis, due to the willingness of the government and parliament 
to allow for their interests (ibid: 38). This goes as far as allowing the social 
partners and other interest representation groups direct creative competencies; 
“In their areas of competence, the social partners often prepare legislative 
proposals, which are then adopted by the government unaltered” (Erhart 2010: 
68, translation from the German original). The status of social partners in Austria 
is described by Tálos und Kittel as internationally unique. This status is largely 
due to the – although varying in nature – “close relationship between governing 
bodies and parties and ministries” (Tálos/Kittel 2001: 41) arising from the 
particularly concise and historically important division between employees 
(Social Democratic Party, SPÖ) and employers (Peoples Party, ÖVP) in Austria. 
The “involvement of the associations in the process of policy formation of the 
ministries“ is differentiated and “intensified in ministries which have traditionally 
strong ties to individual interest groups and associations (Ministries of Social 
Affairs, Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Environment)” (ibid: 49). This is 
particularly relevant in the context of this thesis, as the two policy areas under 
consideration, renewable energy and emissions trading, fall under the auspices 
of two of the three ministries mentioned (Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of 
Environment respectively).  
Tálos und Kittel identify various ways in which interest groups are involved in the 
legislative process, i.a.: 
 
 legislative proposals sent from individual interest groups to ministries 
 participation of interest groups in the forming of government proposals  
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 participation in negotiations to parliamentary proposals 
 contact between interest groups and parliamentary fractions 
 inclusion of experts from interest groups in parliamentary committee 
deliberations (see ibid: 41f). 
 
Although the accession of Austria to the EU has opened up other paths of 
interest representation to interest groups, Tálos und Kittel argue that the national 
level remains the “decisive level for interest representation” (ibid, 48). Corporatist 
actors have various channels of involvement in the determination of the Austrian 
national-level EU position:  
 
 Ministries hold ad hoc meetings at the highest level to discuss individual 
policy. 
 COREPER preparation meetings are held every week, finalising positions 
for Brussels.  
 Interest groups also have the possibility to prepare material for the 
positions discussed in ministry working groups (see ibid: 48).  
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4 Emissions Trading 
Emissions’ trading was first introduced on an international level at the 3rd 
Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) in Kyoto in 1997. The Kyoto Protocol included the first legally binding 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets (during the commitment period, 
2008 – 2012) for the states listed in Annex B of the protocol20. The respective 
targets of the member states are to be reached by direct reductions (although 
the targets of some states actually involve a net increase) in emissions but also 
through the so-called flexible mechanisms. These are emissions trading, joint 
implementation and the clean development mechanism, the latter two of which 
are not relevant for the purpose of this study and will not be described here. The 
allowed emissions of Annex B states are divided into ‘assigned amount units’ 
(AAUs)21. Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol states that “The Parties included in 
Annex B may participate in emissions trading for the purposes of fulfilling their 
commitments” (UN 1997: 15), and as such can sell AAUs they do not need, or 
buy AAUs to cover their commitments respectively. The European Union target 
as set out in Annex B of the KP was a cumulative reduction of 8% for the 
commitment period, in relation to 1990 emissions. This cumulative target was 
then divided amongst member states in the context of the ‘burden sharing’ 
agreement. Within this framework, Austria was assigned a target of minus 13% 
(European Council 2002: 19).  
 
4.1 EU Level 
Emissions’ trading, as it is known in the framework of the EU Emissions Trading 
System (ETS) is of a somewhat different nature to that institutionalized within the 
KP, which is geared toward trading between sovereign nation states. The ETS 
on the other hand, was devised by the EU in an attempt to reduce the emissions 
of industry and power generation (and later aviation) in particular, as a central 
part of compliance with EU member state emission reduction targets under the 
KP. The EU ETS forms one of the three pillars of internal EU climate policy 
                                            
20 Although these only came into effect in 2005, after Russia ratified the protocol, which required 
that 55% of states responsible for 55% of emissions must ratify the treaty for it to come into 
effect. To date the US has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol. 
21 http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/emissions_trading/items/2731.php (accessed: 
17.10.2011) 
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(alongside renewable energy and energy efficiency), and regulates trading of 
emissions certificates between companies (of the aforementioned sectors) within 
the EU. To date it covers over 12,000 facilities, which cumulatively emit around 
43% of total EU Emissions (see Geden/Fischer 2008: 89f).  
 
The EU ETS is currently (2012) in the second of three periods, which have been 
planned to date. The first period, 2005 - 2007 was conceived as a pilot phase in 
which to gain experience. For this period, at least 95% of all EU Allowances 
(EUAs) – the certificates traded within the framework of the ETS – were 
allocated to installations covered by the ETS free of charge (grandfathering). 
During the second period, 2008 - 2012 (identical to the Kyoto commitment 
period), EU member states convert the proportion of total AAUs, which are 
emitted by installations included in the ETS into EUAs, of which at least 90% are 
distributed free of charge. 
These first two trading periods are covered by the directive 2003/87/EC, which 
i.a. stipulates that member states shall develop a national allocation plan (NAP) 
„stating the total quantity of allowances that it intends to allocate for that period 
and how it proposes to allocate them“ (EU 2003: Article 9). NAPs developed by 
member states, were sent in the form of a proposal to the European 
Commission. The Commission had a period of three months to respond to the 
NAP in the form of a decision, which could either accept the plan, reject the plan, 
reject any part of the plan and/or propose amendments (EU 2003: Article 10). 
 
The directive 2003/87/EC was amended in 2009 (directive 2009/29/EC), in which 
the framework for the third trading period, 2013 - 2020 was laid down. Within this 
new directive, aviation was added to emissions covered by the ETS and a 
central, EU-wide cap on total emissions was introduced. This cap is based upon 
the NAPs from the second trading period, and will be reduced by 1.74% annually 
(EU 2009: Article 9) so as to contribute effectively to the EU (self-declared, as 
opposed to internationally binding) emissions reduction target of 20% (in relation 
to 1990) by 202022. Another change for the coming trading period is the fact that 
                                            
22 The contribution of ETS installations is in fact higher than this target. To clarify the different 
targets and baseline years applied, see the following. “The level of the EU-wide cap will be 
calculated on the basis of the target for 20 per cent GHG emission reductions by 2020 compared 
to 1990 levels, which is equivalent to a 14 per cent reduction compared to 2005; the linear 
reduction principle of 1.74 per cent per year means arriving at a reduction of ETS emissions of 21 
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a significantly larger proportion of total EUA's will be auctioned, a fact which was 
subject to much conflict in the European and national level decision making 
processes. 
 
Prior to submitting its proposal for the revision of the original directive, the 
Commission was subject to “intensive lobbying in late 2007 and early 2008, not 
least from energy-intensive industries” (Skaerseth/Wettestad 2010: 75). Not only 
the stage of legal initiative was characterized by intensive interest 
representation; “the European Parliament had registered over 160 groups 
lobbying mainly for free allowances by October 2008” (ibid 81). The outcome 
was that rather than auctioning all certificates, companies in the industry sector 
who are deemed to be at an economic disadvantage through international 
competition and hence in danger of carbon leakage (one of the ‘climate-political-
sceptic’ arguments identified by Nuthall, discussed in the introduction) will be 
given up to 100% of certificates free of charge23. 
Although the decision-making at the European level is not the subject of this 
thesis, it should be briefly stated at this stage that Austrian interest 
representation was very active in lobbying on these issues in Brussels. On the 
one hand, considerable lobbying took place from affected companies. This can 
be seen by the fact that the European Steel Association, Eurofer, of which the 
CEO of the Austrian VOEST is the head, took legal action against the 
benchmarking decision or the intense, direct lobbying of individual European 
Commission staff conducted by Union of Industrial and Employers' 
Confederation of Europe (UNICE, now BUSINESSEUROPE), of which the 
Federation of Industry is a member (see Interview 1: 10). On the other hand, 
workers representatives, in the form of trade unions were also firmly opposed to 
the auctioning of emissions certificates. The respective Austrian union, 
represented on this occasion by the head of the Federation of Trade Unions, 
joined the European metal workers union in protesting in Brussels. In a related 
publication arguments presented included the threat - by the auctioning of 
                                                                                                                                 
per cent below 2005 levels (and 10 per cent for the sectors not covered by the ETS)” 
(Skaerseth/Wettestad 2010: 75). 
23 Defining precisely how many EUAs will be auctioned and how many allocated free of charge is 
difficult, as this varies from country to country. For sectors in danger of carbon leakage, 
benchmarks will be applied (based on the 10% most energy efficient installations), and a 
proportion of allowances allocated free of charge. At least 50% of all EUAs will be auctioned from 
2013 (see http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.htm (accessed 14.11.2011)). 
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certificates - to jobs, to the competitiveness of European steel companies and 
the seemingly immanent threat of relocation of European companies and 
subsequent job loss (see Federation of Trade Unions European Office 2008: 2).  
 
Another issue at stake in this context is the utilization of the revenues from the 
auctioning of certificates. The European Parliaments Environmental Committee 
for example “called for all auctioning revenues to be earmarked for climate 
related purposes” (Skaerseth/Wettestad 2010: 74). Member states, but also 
installations covered by the directive had markedly different interests concerning 
the use of revenues, as will be seen in the Austria-specific analysis. The final text 
of the directive was to all extents and purposes left open to interpretation: “At 
least 50% of the revenues generated from the auctioning of allowances ... should 
be used for one or more of the following: to reduce greenhouse gas emissions ... 
to adapt to the impacts of climate change ... to develop renewable energies ... 
measures to avoid deforestation ...” (European Union 2009b: Article 10, italics 
added). This directive was translated into Austrian law with the 2011 amendment 
of the Emissions Certificates Act (see chapter 4.2.2).  
 
4.2 Austria 
Emissions trading was formally integrated in Austria with the translation of the 
European directive into Austrian national law in the form of the Emissions 
Certificates Act (EC-Act) in April 2004. The law has been reformed a number of 
times, in particular in 2006 with the incorporation of the rules for the allocation of 
emissions certificates for the second – simultaneous with Kyoto – trading period 
from 2008 - 2012; in 2009, where aviation emissions were included in the EU 
ETS for the first time; and finally in 2011, in preparation for the new trading 
period, 2013 - 2020 (see in detail below).  
 
In comparison with legislation concerning renewable energy (see next chapter), 
the EU directive(s) regarding emissions trading had and have little scope for 
interpretation in terms of national level implementation. As such, the EC-Act has 
generally involved a fairly strict translation of European provisions into national 
law. During the first two ETS trading periods (2005 - 2007 & 2008 - 2012), the 
primary point of conflict was the question of allocation – in the form of the 
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national allocation plans (NAPs) – on an individual, installation as well as on a 
sectoral level. In light of the movement away from national level allocation to a 
central European cap and away from the principle of grandfathering, the focus of 
lobbying activities has been transferred to the European level and to issues such 
as benchmarking (see chapter 4.1). However new issues have now arisen – 
such as the use of revenues generated from the auctions of certificates (see 
above) – and are being contested on the national level, as will be demonstrated 
in the discussion on the latest amendment of the EC-Act in 2011 (see chapter 
4.2.2). 
The initial national level focus on the NAPs, was also corroborated by the 
interview conducted with the relevant government representative, who stated 
that „the ordeal was not so much the law, but the allocation plan, transferring the 
rules to the individual sectors and individual installations” (Interview 1: 9, 
translation from the German original). The reasons for this are self-explanatory 
and detailed by the European Environmental Agency (2008) in its technical 
report: “The development of the NAP and the allocation of allowances are at the 
core of the Directive's implementation. These decisions may influence the 
competitive positions and profits of the companies covered by the scheme and 
are, therefore often controversial.” (55). As such the NAPs are an ideal entry 
point for investigating both conflicts and influence.  
 
4.2.1 National Allocation Plans 
In the original research design, the plan in terms of emissions trading was to 
focus on the development of the second NAP in Austria. However, a review of 
the available documentation and the interviews conducted, made it clear that, as 
one interview partner put it, “you can only understand the NAP II, the origins of 
the NAP II, from the background of the origins of the NAP I” (Interview 5: 8f). 
Accordingly, the analysis below begins with the development of the original NAP 
before moving on to the NAP II. 
In their study on the development of the first NAPs, Buchner et. al. (2006) noted 
that, “In all the Member States examined in our project, except one, the 
allocation process can best be described as an extended dialogue between the 
government and industry.” (5). This observation is particularly applicable to, and 
can certainly be corroborated in the case of Austria, where work on the 
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fundamentals of the first NAP started in the form of studies, which were 
conducted 2003, prior to the existence of any legal framework. These studies 
included the baseline study on emissions of ETS installations in Austria, 
commissioned by the Ministry of Environment and conducted by the Institute for 
Industrial Ecology and the Federal Environmental Agency as well as a study 
commissioned by both government ministries and stakeholders24 and conducted 
by the Institute for Economic Research (WIFO) and KWI consultants. The first 
study mentioned, was conducted to ascertain the actual, then current level of 
(ETS) emissions and the approximate distance of individual installations to 
sectoral best practice levels (see Windsperger et. al. 2004: 3). The second study 
referred to, looked at the different possible methods of allocation and their 
potential effects on three sectors. This study identified three possible means of 
allocation: planned production, planned production using benchmarks and 
historical production (see WIFO & KWI 2003: 2f). The study found that all three 
sectors considered – iron and steel, cement and paper (see ibid: 3f) – would 
grow in the period to 2007 and that the growth in efficiency would be lower than 
the growth in production and hence a sum-total growth in emissions was to be 
expected (see ibid: 4). A central conclusion of the study was that “compared to 
allocation based on historic emissions”, when using a means of allocation which 
considers future production, “higher amounts of certificates could be reckoned 
with” (ibid: 6, translated from the German original).  
Although being a perfectly legitimate means of ex-ante calculation of future 
emissions, applying trend studies as opposed to historical emissions provided for 
a higher business-as-usual scenario. “The point was, where is the baseline; from 
which point to do you subtract (note: the climate factor, or contribution to 
emissions reduction target)” (Interview 1: 6). The question of the method for 
determining the total amount of certificates to allocate was clearly one of the 
central conflicts in the development of the NAPs. On the one hand, the 
environmental ministry (the representative mentioned that environmental NGOs 
were not really present in the debate, due to the complex and technical nature of 
the material) (see Interview 1: 8) which is in charge of Austria’s (legally binding) 
emissions reduction targets had the agenda of keeping the total amount of 
certificates as low as possible, and on the other hand industry and power 
                                            
24 Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Commerce, Federation of Industry, Federation of Paper 
Industry, Voest Alpine AG, Chamber of Commerce and a cement company. 
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generation installations covered by the ETS wanted to keep their costs as low as 
possible, and as such lobbied for high allocation of certificates. As Hyll et. al. 
(2004) have noted, “due to the interests of the sectors concerned, a consensus 
could only be reached based on generous allocation” (255, translated from the 
German original), not least because, „due to incomplete information and fear 
about a deterioration in competitiveness (particularly in relation to the acceding 
countries), industry adopted a hard negotiation position during the process of 
preparing the national allocation plan“ (ibid: 256). This is also clearly 
corroborated in the interview with the Federation of Industry representative, with 
respect to the studies conducted prior to the first NAP: “We knew that industry 
would be emitting a few million tons of CO2 more in the years to come, and as 
such – for us internally in the IV – it was totally clear that a historical allocation 
was unacceptable and it was then all about anchoring the second option, the 
trend studies, politically“ (Interview 5: 9).  
Not only were the affected business sectors involved in this process, but other 
government ministries, evidently more concerned with servicing their particular 
clientele rather than reaching a reduction in emissions, also pushed for higher 
allocation. In Austria, as was the case in most EU countries “the government 
participants in this process were nearly always the environmental ministry in the 
lead with the ministry charged with economy or trade heavily involved (…) either 
as a means of obtaining the necessary data or at the instigation of industry.” 
(Buchner et. al. 2006: 6). In the case of Austria this was summarized quite 
succinctly by the representative from the Ministry of Environment: “We needed 
the consent of the Minister of Commerce, who refused his consent, until 
business had what it wanted“ (Interview 1: 8).  
 
Pressure for higher allocation was not only mediated through the relevant 
ministry or interest representation organisations, but also occurred directly. This 
situation and the conflict between the wish for restrictive allocation from the 
Ministry for Environment on the one side, and intense pressure from various 
angles pushing for higher allocation on the other side is well captured in the 
following quote: „I would have wished for a lower total allocation, but the political 
pressure was infinitely high – on us – of course also on the Minster – through the 
commerce minister – through other ministers – direct pressure on the federal 
chancellor. Eder – from Voest – reaches for the telephone and calls the 
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chancellor“ (Interview 1: 6). This estimation was also clearly corroborated in 
another interview conducted: “In the case of emissions trading, they (note: 
Voest) and also general director Eder always lobbied intensively” (Interview 6: 4). 
 
Individual lobbying and cumulative efforts in the form of studies and pressure 
from interest representation, described above, culminated in a business-as-usual 
scenario for the first NAP, for the period 2005 – 2007, of 34.7 mill. tons of CO2 
annually. Once the climate factor had been subtracted from the business-as-
usual emissions total, the total number of certificates to be allocated every year 
stood at 33 mill. tons (see Tab. I below). 
 
Tab. I: Business-as-Usual, Allocation and Emissions for NAPs (mill. tons) 
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Sources: adopted from Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water 2007 
and Federal Environment Agency 2009 
 
As can be seen from Table I, average emissions during the first trading period 
were half a ton under the total quantity of certificates allocated. Although this 
‘only’ translates to 1.5 per cent of the total annual certificates issued, the 
consequence is that an instrument designed to act as an economic incentive to 
reduce carbon emissions is over allocated and not only does the instrument not 
have the desired effect of incentivizing low-carbon investment, but in the worst 
case subsidizes corporate profit.  
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What makes emissions trading a particularly interesting case in point, is that on 
the one hand there is a sectoral or even trans-sectoral, all ETS installations 
encompassing interest which, as has been shown above, brought pressure to 
bear on actors at various different levels using a variety of means. What makes 
the issue so contested however is that, as has been noted by Buchner et. al., 
there is also the individual, self-maximizing interest at an installation level: “On 
the part of industry, there was of course much lobbying, but the fixed total forced 
all players into a zero-sum game where a defensive concern about what 
competitors would receive became as important as offensive attempts to gain 
more for themselves.” (2006: 6).   
This is also clearly evident in Austria. In relation to the two creation of both NAP I 
and II, the representative from the Ministry of Environment interviewed stated 
that “It was a protracted process. We have around 210 installations in Austria 
and I have had practically every one of those 210 installations sitting here at 
some point during those years” (Interview 1: 8f).  On the installation level, 
“everyone fought for every single ton” (ibid: 9).  
 
On the level of ETS installation interest representation, “the challenge for the 
NAP II, was to salvage the basic method, the growth or trend orientated scenario 
into the second allocation period, and that was successful” (Interview 5: 9). Quite 
how successful this activity was is demonstrated by the business-as-usual 
scenario in the Austrian NAP II. Although the amount of certificates allocated and 
the actual emissions (to 2010) were considerably lower than in the NAP I, the 
initial business-as-usual scenario, at 38.1 mill. tons, was over 3 mill. tons higher 
than the corresponding scenario in the NAP I. As the representative from the 
Ministry of Environment put it, „the goal of these studies was to calculate as high 
as possible – huge growth – absurd, absurd results“ (Interview 1: 6).  
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Tab. II: Business-as-Usual, Allocation and Emissions for NAP II (mill. tons) 
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Sources: adopted from Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water 2007 
and Federal Environment Agency 2011 & 2012 
 
As was the case in the NAP I, the actual observed average emissions are below 
the allocated amount of certificates. In this case, the discrepancy can be 
explained by the emissions in 2009, which due to the financial and economic 
crisis were over 3 mill. tons beneath the allocated level. Had the initial Austrian 
proposal (which was subsequently reduced by the European Commission, see 
below) been accepted however, then the difference between allocation and 
actual emissions would have been significantly higher, resulting in a certificates 
market considerably longer than it already currently is (Lewis 2012), further 
diminishing the incentive for low-carbon investment.  
 
As has already been mentioned above, the creation of the NAP II was not only 
surrounded by considerable conflicts between various interests within the 
Austrian national framework, but also between the Austrian and European levels. 
In the draft NAP sent from the Austrian Ministry of Environment to the European 
Commission in January 2007, 32.8 mill. certificates per annum were proposed 
(Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water 2007: 5). In its 
decision on the Austrian NAP II, the Commission stated that “the intended total 
quantity of allowances to be allocated according to the national allocation plan 
would be inconsistent with achieving Austria’s commitment under Decision 
2002/358/EC and the Kyoto Protocol.” (European Commission 2007: 3). Due to 
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this contravention of Austrian commitments, the Commission decreased the total 
number of annual certificates by over 2 mill., resulting in a final total of 30.7 mill. 
tons (see Tab. II). The result was an outcry from industry, “but fortunately we 
prevailed and told them that there is little point in protesting, that will only result 
in legal uncertainty. They pushed us, told us we must object and so on” 
(Interview 1: 11).  
 
As can be seen quite clearly above, ETS installations and their interest 
representation organisations were remarkably successful during the creation of 
both NAP I and II. Sceptical arguments were fairly limited within the whole 
process and confined to issues of (the) necessity for growth on the one hand, 
and individual issues of competitiveness on the other. ETS installations however 
did not need to utilize sceptical arguments because firstly, the debate was of a 
far too technical nature for most people and organisations (reference was also 
made to environmental NGOs) to understand (see Interview 1: 8) and secondly, 
interest representation were able to influence the process directly through the 
baseline studies conducted on their behalf.  
The privileged position and access of relevant interest organisations in Austria 
will be discussed in further detail in chapter 6, however during the course of the 
interviews a particularly illustrative point was made, which will be touched upon 
here. When asked about how these actors are involved/involve themselves in the 
decision-making process, the representative from the environmental ministry 
stated that “we have a technical working group in which business representatives 
sit, also the Chamber of Commerce, the Federation of Industry and the 
Association of Austrian Energy. And the ministerial representation in essence is 
the economics ministry“ (Interview 1: 8). What is particularly interesting about this 
statement is the fact that interest representation organisations participate in a 
technical working group, a working group to which they are by definition invited 
as experts and not as (vested) interests. When vested interests are 
communicated in the apparent form of expert knowledge – something usually 
attributed to the scientific and supposedly interest ‘neutral’ realm – they gain a 
totally different form of legitimation then they would otherwise have and interests 
(which are counterproductive in terms of progressive climate policy) ‘become’ 
expert knowledge which forms the basis for of so-called ‘evidence-based’ policy 
making. 
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4.2.2 Emissions Certificates Act - Amendment 2011 
With the 2011 amendment to the EC-Act, the EU directive 2009/28/EC was 
translated into national law. As has been stated above, with the relocation of 
decision-making regarding allocation of emissions certificates (the primary issue 
within emissions trading) to the European level, conflicts within the amendment 
were reduced to matters such as the question of the dedication of income gained 
through the auctioning of emissions certificates. As such, this chapter will be kept 
fairly brief and touch only upon this issue. As has been mentioned in chapter 4.1, 
the directive stated that a minimum of 50% of revenues should be used for 
climate mitigation and adaptation purposes. Accordingly, the ministerial draft 
introduced into parliament in April 2011 stated, “The income generated through 
auctioning shall go to the federal government. This income is to be used in 
particular for (…)” (Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and 
Water 2011: §21) at which point the measures described in the respective 
paragraph of the directive are listed. In the following comment period, a number 
of governmental and non-governmental organisations addressed this issue. The 
federal states primary concern was that the funds should flow to the federal 
government and not, at least in part, into their budget (see for example, Federal 
State of Burgenland 2011: 1). 
One energy company, Verbund, and other stakeholders – primarily interest 
representation organisations – such as the Federation of Industry, Austria’s 
Electricity, the Chamber of Commerce’s gas sector but also the Ministry of 
Commerce all demanded that the money flow back to Austrian companies in one 
form or another. Various arguments included using the money to compensate 
carbon leakage or for efficiency measures in the energy and industrial sectors 
(Federal Ministry of Commerce, Family and Youth 2011: 4), “should be made 
available to Austrian companies” (Chamber of Commerce, Sector for Gas and 
Heating Companies 2011: 5) or used by ETS installations for energy efficiency 
measures (Federation of Industry 2011: 2). Most other comments received did 
not touch upon this particular issue.  
Although the arguments employed by actors arguing for the allocation of funds 
(back) to Austrian companies are not sceptical arguments as such, they do 
argue for a policy which would subsidize companies with exactly the funds which 
are being levied upon them to incentivize change.  
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On the other hand, although not brought to bear in the comment period, the 
position of the green party (as mentioned in their amendment proposal, 
subsequently rejected, during the parliamentary debate on the government bill) 
was to bind the revenue to climate protection measures, without further 
specification (Parliament of the Republic of Austria 2011: 271). This position is 
similar to that of the environmental ministry (see Interview 1: 12) and to the 
position of environmental NGOs (who presumably did not comment as this use 
was implied by the original legal text contained in the ministerial draft).  
Interestingly enough in this case the government bill when it was introduced in 
September 2011 (and the respective paragraph in the legal text, which passed 
unchanged), all references to what the revenue from auctioning of certificates 
should be used for had vanished, and the text stated: “The income shall flow to 
the federal government.” (Federal Government of Austria 2011: §21). In this case 
the Finance Ministry, such was the appraisal of our interview partner from the 
government ministry (see Interview 1: 12), had vetoed any earmarking. Due to 
the fiscal austerity and budget consolidation taking place in all European 
countries at the time (post 2008/2009 financial crisis) this is not particularly 
surprising. It would be hard to argue that the financial ministry took in a position 
of climate scepticism in this case, but it is a good example – when revenue 
generated by climate policy is not earmarked for climate policy, even when this is 
suggested by the relevant EU legislation - of climate policy being considerably 
lower on the list of governmental (and of course also other) priorities. 
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5 Green electricity act 
As outlined in chapter 3, the primary anthropogenic contribution to climate 
change is the emission of greenhouse gases resulting from the combustion of 
fossil fuels. One of the major sources of fossil fuel consumption and hence global 
GHG emissions is the production of energy. Consequentially, one of the primary 
motivations for supporting the production of energy from renewable sources (RE; 
solar, wind, hydro, biomass, geothermal etc.) is that it “displaces fossil fuel based 
energy and thus contributes directly to the reduction of emissions from energy 
consumption” (Howes 2010: 117). Within the context of this thesis this argument 
- based upon climate change mitigation potential - for promoting the production 
of RE is also the most relevant, although it is far from the only such reason. 
There are also several different potential reasons for increasing the use of RE 
such as diversified energy supply, improved trade balance (for net importers of 
fossil fuels), economic and employment benefits (the sector employs over 1.4 
mill. people in the EU) (ibid), the so-called ‘first-mover’ advantage, defence 
against long-term price increase and/or price volatility of fossil fuels and reduced 
health risks (Philibert 2011: 9).  
 
One of the barriers to production of RE are the high costs in relation to 
“competing energy sources” (Howes 2010: 120), “due to the fact that energy 
prices for conventional fuel cycles do not currently reflect the objective full cost, 
including the external cost to society of environmental damage caused by their 
use” (European Commission 1997: 6). For this reason many countries have 
developed some form of support for RE. Operating support measures are the 
most common form and range from feed-in tariffs (fixed total price per unit of 
electricity) and premiums (paid on top of the market price) to quota obligations 
(obliging consumers, producers or grid operators to source certain percentages 
of energy from RE) (see ibid: 120f). Whereas 55 countries had some form of 
support mechanism in place in 2005, this number had increased to 119 in early 
2011 (REN21 2011: 48). Accordingly global installed wind power has increased 
11-fold to 198 gigawatts from 2000 to 2010 and Photovoltaic has increase 28-
fold to 40 gigawatts in the same period, to mention a few examples (ibid: 20ff). 
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5.1 EU Level 
The creation of EU policy on RE was beset by considerable challenges and 
conflicts, resulting in a considerable legislative time-frame. Following a Green 
Paper – ‘Energy for the Future: Renewable Sources of Energy’ published in 
1996, the European Commission released its White Paper – by the same name 
– in 1997, but did not propose a directive until mid 2000 (see Rowlands 2005: 
966). These conflicts related to definitions on the one hand – primarily regarding 
large hydro (over 10 MW) and the amount of support to be given to various 
energy sources – to conflicts over targets on the other. The conflicts on targets 
ranged from the question of the EU total increase, between the EP and EC, to 
the question of the baseline for measuring RE production (and hence the 
percentage target in 2010). In Austria this conflict continued for quite some time, 
as the target stated in the directive, 78.1% of electricity generation by 2010, 
related to a total electricity consumption volume (in 2010) of 56 TWh, a figure 
which was clearly an inaccurate estimate (ibid: 967f).  
In 2001 a consensus was reached and the subsequent directive, 2001/77/EC25, 
was published with the purpose of promoting “an increase in the contribution of 
renewable energy sources to electricity production in the internal market for 
electricity” (EU 2001). This directive provided the framework for the original 
version of the law on RE as well as the 2006 amendment (see below).  
The directive itself was amended as part of the European Climate and Energy 
Package (see chapter 3) resulting in the directive 2009/28/EC – with adjusted 
targets – which provides the framework for the law on RE 2012.  
 
5.2 Austria 
Austria actually had legally defined targets for renewable energy prior to the 
translation of the first RE directive into national law. In 1998 the Austrian 
parliament passed the electricity market law (ElWOG), on the basis of the EU 
internal electricity market directive (96/92/EC). Although the directive only stated 
that “A Member State may require the system operator ... to give priority to 
generating installations using renewable energy sources” (European Union 1996: 
                                            
25 The corresponding directive (2003/30/EC) for the transport sector, the so-called Biofuels 
Directive, was passed in 2003 (Howes 2010: 122).  
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Article 7, italics added), the national law made it mandatory for grid operators to 
increasingly purchase renewable energy with a national target of 3% (excluding 
hydro) to be reached by 2005 (see Federal Republic of Austria 1998: § 31).  
 
In 2002 the Green electricity act was passed. This original version of the law 
specified a commitment to accept electrical energy from renewable resources, at 
prices (feed-in tariffs) to be established by legislative regulation by the Ministry 
for Commerce in consultation with the Ministry for Environment and the Ministry 
for Justice (Federal Republic of Austria 2002a: §10 & 11). No limits were placed 
on the total volume of support to be given or the total number of installations able 
to apply within a given time frame. The costs of the support measures were 
raised by a cent-per-kWh charge, levied on end customers by network operators 
(ibid: §22).  
 
5.2.1 2006 Amendment 
In 2006 the GE-Act was first amended. The position of all three interview 
partners, interviewed in the exploratory phase of the research was that this 
modification was a considerable set back for the production of renewable energy 
in Austria. 
Following significant growth of installations in the RE sector – some of which, 
even staunch RE proponents have argued, were not of the highest quality (see 
Interview 7: 6) – and as such, rising costs of RE for end customers, many actors, 
ranging from government ministries themselves, over the regulatory authority to 
interest representatives, demanded a cap on the amount of RE support (see ibid: 
9). In early 2004, around one-and-a-half years after the original law, a number of 
interest representation groups – the Federation of Industry, Chamber of 
Commerce, Chamber of Labour and the Federation of Trade Unions (the so-
called ‘alliance of payers’) (Chamber of Commerce 2006: 5) – made suggestions 
as to how the law could be amended. It should be noted at this stage that 
representatives from the Austrian federal states have suggested that the (lack of) 
efficiency of many of the installations receiving support (one of the primary 
arguments), could have been tackled by reforming the tariff regulations and that 
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the inclusion of a cap26 coupled with the reform of tariffs was equal to a double 
restriction (see Interview 7: 6 & 7) and the lengthy legislative reform process 
described in the following - and hence the set backs for the production of RE - 
have been avoided. Clearly other interests – e.g. the capping of funds made 
available and hence the capping of RE production – played a part.  
 
The arguments in support of the list of suggestions for reforming the GE-Act, 
made by the ‘alliance of payers’ in March 2004 were as follows: “For business, 
particularly energy intensive industry, a further increase in the energy cost 
burden would inevitably lead to a halt in investment, relocation of production and 
endanger international competitiveness with negative impacts on employment 
and regional development” (Chamber of Labour, Chamber of Commerce, 
Federation of Industry & Federation of Trade Unions 2004 cit. in Glawischnig 
2004: 8, translation from German original27).  
 
The demands of the ‘alliance of payers’ included, i.a.: 
 Immediate re-regulation of feed-in tariffs 
 Considerable lowering of feed-in tariffs 
 Declining feed-in tariffs 
 Limiting support to “the amount of funds available”  
 Limitation of costs for energy intensive industry 
 Concentration of support funds on the most economically efficient 
installations (ibid: 9 & Chamber of Commerce 2006: 4) 
 
                                            
26 In the following discussion, much reference is made to the cap placed on additional funds for 
RE installations. Between 2002 and 2006 where no such cap existed, any RE installation that 
fulfilled the applicable criteria would be granted funding (either in the form of investment 
subsidies for hydro power or heat and power co-generation installations or in the form of feed-in 
tariffs for other installations). As of 2006 the additional funding made available for new 
installations was capped (initially at 17 mill. Euros annually). The cap on funding for feed-in tariffs 
related to the respective year in question - once accepted under the RE regime, installations 
would receive the feed-in tariffs for the full period (so if 17 mill. Euros is made available for feed-
in tariffs annually, then total feed-in tariffs would be at 17 mill. Euros in year 1, 34 mill. Euros in 
year 2, 51 mill. Euros in year 3 etc.). 
27 It should be noted that the source cited is a member of the Austrian Green Party. The ‘social 
partner document’ referred to in the powerpoint presentation from the Chamber of Commerce 
cited below (at that time still ‘secret’) was included as part of press conference documents on 20th 
of April 2004. The arguments and demands included are corroborated within the powerpoint 
presentation and in various other documents from the actors in question. 
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In July 2004, the ministry presented a draft bill, subsequently made available for 
comments. Several of the demands made by the ‘alliance of payers’ were 
included. §10 was re-written to include the cap, limiting support to the “the 
amount of funds available” (Ministry of Commerce 2004: 7). Suggestions were 
also included to differentiate the costs of RE, depending on the network level28 of 
the customer (ibid: 10f). Although this is not an actual limitation of costs for 
energy intensive industry (a measure finally agreed upon in the second 
amendment of 2008 in the infamous §22c regulation, which was later overturned 
by the European Commission on the grounds of competition and environmental 
issues) (see European Commission 2011: 1) as demanded, it clearly benefits 
larger customers (for example the proposed regulation stipulates RE costs of 
0.067c / kWh for network levels 1-3, 0.176c / kWh for levels 4-5, 0.207c / kWh for 
level 6 and 0.334c / kWh for level 7 – households, for 2005) (ibid: 10). A concrete 
limitation of the additional annual funds available in terms of figures was not 
included in the ministerial draft, nor was the concept of declining tariffs.  
 
The comment period for the 2006 amendment of the GE-Act was very unusual, 
in the sense that no comments were received from any members of the ‘alliance 
of payers’ who are normally amongst the most vocal and very rarely fail to pass 
comment on bills relevant to them. This would suggest that they were either 
satisfied by the fact that many of their comments had been taken account of in 
the ministerial draft and/or decided to continue to pursue their agenda on a more 
informal level.  
Comments were received from a number of actors, including ministries, all 
federal states, NGOs and other institutions such as the Court of Audit. The 
federal states all categorically rejected the ministerial draft, many of them 
referring to reform suggestions made by the provincial governor’s conference 
earlier that year29. In general, much criticism was levelled at the draft. The state 
of Burgenland, for example, mentioned that the measures were not in 
accordance with the climate strategy and would lead to Austria being unable to 
                                            
28 The Austrian electricity grid is split-up into 7 different levels. Typical customers on network 
levels 1 & 2 are energy intensive industry; levels 3 & 4: industry; level 5: medium sized business 
(non-industrial) and small industry; level 6 small business (non-industrial); level 7 households. 
The various levels are charged differing lump-sum RE costs: levels 4-7: €15,000 p.a.; level 5: 
€3,300 p.a.; level 6: €300 p.a.; level 7: €15 p.a. (Austrian Wind Energy Association s.a.) 
29 The author searched for the suggestions referred to in the comments but was unable to find 
them. 
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reach its EU RE targets and Kyoto reduction targets (2004: 2). Several states 
criticised the legal uncertainty for operators of RE installations resulting from the 
cap on support to the “the amount of funds available” (e.g. ibid: 9, Federal State 
of Lower Austria 2004: 3).  
 
It is of considerable significance – bearing in mind the traditionally strong position 
of federal states in Austria – that neither the suggestions of the conference of 
governors were adopted nor the main points of criticism levelled at the draft 
included in their comments incorporated in the subsequent government bill. A 
federal state representative remarked in this respect that the states tried to have 
the cap removed from the draft (see Interview 7: 3) but to no avail. It was 
contended that in the case of the GE-Act, the E-Control represented the interests 
of the Federation of Industry the Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber of 
Labour and their arguments (see ibid: 8).  
 
In October 2004, the government bill entered parliament. The cap on support 
based on “the amount of funds available” was included, additional annual funds 
were limited to 17 mill. Euros for 2005 – 2010, and declining tariffs – another of 
the central demands of the ‘alliance of payers’, not included in the ministerial 
draft – had been incorporated (Federal Government of Austria 2004).  
 
Due to the fact that the GE-Act requires a two-thirds majority to be accepted in 
parliament, the then governing conservative-freedom party government was 
reliant on the approval of the social democratic party. Due to a number of 
reasons30 – i.a. demands on power-heat cogeneration – negotiations collapsed. 
Only once suggestions for a compromise had been made by the ‘alliance of 
payers’, did the law pass the parliamentary committee – almost a year later – 
and after a further six months, in which the funding mechanism for support funds 
was entirely reworked, the amendment finally passed parliament in May 2006 
(see Chamber of Commerce 2006: 6).  
 
Within the legal text, the so-called RE cap was upheld. In essence, the – 
formerly unlimited – commitment to purchase RE was capped by the “amount of 
                                            
30 Reasons which are not relevant to the questions posed in this thesis and will not be discussed 
in any more detail here. 
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funds available” (Federal Republic of Austria 2006a: §10). The cap for additional 
funds available each year of 17 mill. Euros, was adopted for the years 2007 – 
2011 (ibid: §21a). 
On the other hand, it was established that feed-in tariffs were to be decided upon 
either annually or bi-annually as of 2006 and to decline on an annual basis (ibid: 
§11).  Furthermore feed-in tariffs for new installations were lowered and the 
period of validity for feed-in tariffs shortened (see Tab. III). 
 
Tab. III: comparison of provisions within feed-in tariff regulations 2002 & 2006 
  Period of validity Wind energy feed-in tariffs (kWh)31
Feed-in tariff regulation 2002 13 years 7.80c 
Feed-in tariff regulation 200632  10 years + 75% in y11 + 50% in j12 7.65c 
Feed-in tariff regulation 200633  10 years + 75% in y11 + 50% in j12 7.55c 
Sources: adopted from Federal Republic of Austria 2002b & 2006b 
 
The 2006 amendment to the GE-Act also changed the funding mechanism. As 
opposed to the varying charges per network level initially included in the 
ministerial draft, the original cent-per-kWh charge from 2002 was replaced by a 
charge per metering point – differing depending on network levels 1-7 - coupled 
with a RE mark-up on electricity prices. This new system “substantially benefited 
industrial customers“ (Hauer 2006: 9). 
 
The changes enacted in the legal act and the regulation had considerable 
consequences for the production of energy from renewable resources. Whereas 
it has been argued that the original legal form may not have been optimal (see 
Interview 3: 7, Interview 4: 13 & Interview 7: 6), one consequence of the reforms 
undertaken 2006 was, for example, “that no wind turbine was built in Austria for 
the next three years” (Interview 1: 15). One of the primary reasons for the 
amendment and the new tariffs was the question of costs. One of the 
government representatives interviewed stated that “we saw ... how much the 
costs were escalating and wanted to avoid that – that was the main reason. It 
                                            
31 It was decided to use the example of feed-in tariffs for wind energy as these are most 
comparable over time 
32 for 2006 
33 for 2007 
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was said, so many mill. are available and no more” (Interview 4: 13). The rise in 
total costs of RE support are illustrated in Fig. I.  
 
Fig. I: total renewable energy support volume (mill. Euros)34 
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Source: adopted from E-Control 2011 
 
Clearly the costs were the central conflict within the debate on support for RE. 
“Payers” and also government representatives were “afraid” of “overwhelming” 
costs (ibid). Together, the Ministry of Commerce, the regulatory authority and the 
social partners pushed the agenda of a cap on RE support funds, against the will 
of the federal states, but also NGOs and individual institutions (see Interview 7: 
9).  
Some arguments employed have been mentioned above. The primary line of 
argument was that further economic strain for energy-intensive industry and 
households would be completely unreasonable (see Federation of Industry 2005) 
and would lead to Austrian industry being unable to employ Austrian workers and 
produce on an energy and environmentally efficient level (see Federation of 
Industry 2004).  
                                            
34 The total amount of RE support shown in Fig. !, is of course determined in part by the market 
price for electricity. This is due to the fact that, the actual costs for feed-in tariffs are determined 
by the height of tariffs minus the market price. Thus the higher the market price, the lower the 
additional funds required to reach the respective feed-in tariff level. The market prices for the 
same period are depicted in annex III.  
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Interestingly enough, the representative of the trade unions in Austria 
interviewed in the context of this thesis, was of the opinion that the RE costs for 
the VOEST Alpine (Austria’s largest industrial firm) for example, when compared 
with the companies earnings were “pocket change” and that that law on RE lies 
under the “level of perception” of companies such as the VOEST (Interview 6: 4). 
 
It seems clear from the above analysis, that many actors with the agenda of 
limiting support for RE – as an interview partner from the Chamber of Labour put 
it, “to demand cost restrictions for households, also means demanding a 
restriction on development of renewable energy” (Interview 2: 13) – were very 
successful as both additional funds and feed-in tariffs were limited and reduced. 
As such, influence seems to be given. The question, also posed to interview 
partners, is why the ‘alliance of payers’ and others were, as our interview partner 
from the Federation of Industry put it in self-referential terms, “to successful in 
2006” (Interview 5: 7)? One possible answer, which throws up a whole host of 
other questions, is that “when the Chamber of Commerce is really against 
something, then it is difficult to achieve it” (Interview 4: 6).  
 
5.2.2 Green electricity act 2012 
In an initial improvement (in terms of production of RE) - following a lengthy 
period in which very few RE installations in general (Federal Environment 
Agency 2012) and no wind turbines in particular (see above) were built in Austria 
– tariff regulations were reformed in 2010. On the one hand feed-in tariffs for 
wind power were increased, on the other hand the period of validity was 
increased for all types of installations (see Tab. IV). 
 
Tab. IV: comparison of provisions within feed-in tariff regulations 2009 & 2010 
  Period of validity Wind energy feed-in tariffs (kWh) 
Feed-in tariff regulation 2009 10 years + 75% in y11 + 50% in j12 7.53c 
Feed-in tariff regulation 2010  
13 years (wind, PV, geothermal), 15 
years (biomass-, gas etc.) 
9.7c 
Sources: adopted from Federal Republic of Austria 2009 & 2010 
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The reformed feed-in tariffs resulted in a boom in applications for RE support in 
2010. However, as has been noted in the context of the amendment 2006 
(above), RE was in effect subject to a double restriction and as a result the flood 
of applications had soon fully utilized the capped amount of support (21 mill. 
Euros in additional RE support annually) (Federal Republic of Austria 2008: 
§21a).  
 
The new green electricity act 201235 addressed this problem and improved 
conditions for RE production considerably. In terms of comparability to the 
amendment of 2006, it should be noted that §10 which stipulated the cap on the 
commitment to purchase RE by the “amount of funds available”36 and §11 
relating to declining feed-in tariffs37, although subject to criticism in the comment 
period (see for example Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment 
and Water 2011: 7, Friends of the Earth Austria 2011: 2, Chamber of Agriculture 
2011: 7), did not change38 in the course of the legislative reform in 2011.  
 
The draft bill for the GE-Act 2012 was presented to parliament in late March 
2011. §4 included goals for the production of RE by 2015. §23 stipulated a cap 
(formerly in §21a) of 800 mill. Euros in total funding for RE production (equivalent 
to approx. 30 mill. Euros in annual, additional funding based on 2011 electricity 
prices) (Günsberg 2011). This was a change away from the original form of 
stipulating the additional funds available each year and was subject to criticism in 
terms of its volatility to changing market prices (if the total financial volume 
available for RE is stipulated, then rising market prices inevitably lead to lower 
support volume) (see Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and 
Water 2011: 15). Other changes included, for example, a one-time allocation of 
total support volume of 1,000 mill. Euros (§56) for wind energy to remove the 
accumulated back-log of applications, albeit at a feed-in tariff of 9.3c / kWh 
(below the tariffs in the regulation) (see Ministry of Commerce, Family and Youth 
2011).  
 
                                            
35 Passed parliament in July 2011. Originally a further amendment of the law was planned, but 
changes turned out to be so significant that the legal form of an entirely new law was chosen. 
36 Changed to §12 in the GE-Act 2012 
37 Changed to §19 in the GE-Act 2012 
38 The wording of the individual paragraphs was changed in part. What is meant is that no 
substantial changes in terms of the effects of the provisions were made. 
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In the comment period 40 comments were received in total. Interestingly enough, 
three of the four members of the ‘alliance of payers’ formed for the 2006 
amendment who did not comment in 2004 (comment period for the 2006 
amendment), commented on this occasion. The Chamber of Labour’s primary 
concerns related to the energetic use of foodstuffs (a fairly ideological issue, see 
below) and to RE costs of low-income households (2011: 2 & 3f). The Federation 
of Industry made its acceptance of the total RE funding of 800 mill. Euros 
dependent upon a cost restriction for energy intensive industry (2011: 5). The 
Federation of Trade Unions has (partly) changed its stance on RE (from 
restrictive to progressive), not least due to participation in a forum together with 
many NGOs (Interview 6: 2), and although sharing some points of view with the 
Chamber of Labour (e.g. protection of low-income households) also voiced many 
of the same concerns as environmental NGOs (Federation of Trade Unions 
2011: 2ff). No comment was received from the Chamber of Commerce. 
 
Renewable energy interest representation groups, environmental NGOs and 
several federal states shared many concerns relating to suggestions made in the 
ministerial draft. Although differing with regard to specific paragraphs (and in 
relation to the specific interests, such as type of energy to be supported) many 
comments coming from this (admittedly heterogeneous) group were quite similar. 
There was a high level of consensus, for example, regarding the time-frame for 
targets, with almost all comments making reference to the fact that the EU 
climate and energy package has targets for 2020 and hence also demanding 
targets for 2020 (as opposed to 2015) for the Austrian bill (see i.a. Biomass 
Association 2011: 1, Green Party 2011: 1, Friends of the Earth Austria 2011: 1 or 
Federal State of Tyrol 2011: 1). With regards to the amount of support for RE, 
demands ranged from removing the cap completely (see i.a. Federal Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water 2011: 4, Friends of the Earth 
Austria 2011: 2) to comments requesting clarification (see i.a. Federal State of 
Styria 2011: 1, Federal State of Corinthia 2011: 1) or removal (see i.a. Compost 
Partnership 2011, Federal State of Lower Austria 2011: 5) of the stipulated total 
amount of support according to §23 of the proposal. Several comments also 
criticised the proposed tariff of 9.3c / kWh for wind energy (for the application 
back-log removal) in §56 (see i.a. ibid: 30, Union of Wind Energy 2011: 1).  
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When the government bill was introduced into parliament in mid 2011, several of 
the concerns voiced in the comment period had been addressed. Concrete 
targets for each form of RE were included for the period 2010 to 2020, including 
1,000 MW hydro power, 2,000 MW wind power, 200 MW biomass and biogas 
power and 1,000 MW photovoltaic power see (Federal Government of Austria 
2011: §4). 
In terms of the annual support volume, the bill abandoned the idea of total 
financial volume (as suggested in the ministerial draft) and reverted to the 
original form of total additional volume. As opposed to the (approximately 
equivalent) 30 mill. Euros originally suggested, the bill provided for 40 mill. Euros 
additional support volume annually. Furthermore the 1,000 mill. Euros of one 
time total support for the backlog of wind energy applications (originally §56), 
was replaced with an additional support volume of 60 mill. Euros for wind energy 
and 28 mill. Euros for photovoltaic energy (ibid: §23). 
The criticism levelled at the lower feed-in tariffs offered to the back-logged wind 
energy applications (9.3c as opposed to 9.7c / kWh) was also addressed. 
Installations entering a contractual agreement with the clearing and settlement 
agency for green electricity (German: Ökostromabwicklungsstelle) in 2012 or 
2013 were to receive feed-in tariffs of 9.7c / kWh. Installations entering a 
contractual agreement in 2014 or later were to receive 9.4c / kWh (ibid: §56). 
 
The final legal text, passed in July 2011, also included several changes. Targets 
for 2020 remained unchanged from the government bill, with the exception of 
photovoltaic energy which was increased from 1,000 MW to 1,200 MW (Federal 
Republic of Austria 2011: §4).  
Additional annual support volume was also increased from 40 mill. to 50 mill. 
Euros and the additional support volume for the wind energy backlog was 
increased from 60 mill. to 80 mill. Euros (ibid: §23). The feed-in tariffs for back-
logged wind energy applications entering a contractual agreement in 2014 or 
later were also improved (ibid: §56). 
In terms of the source of RE funding, both the Chamber of Labour and the 
Federation of Industry were successful with their demands. In terms of a cost 
restriction for low income households a limit of 20 Euros of RE costs was 
introduced (Federal Republic of Austria 2011: §49). The costs for energy 
intensive industry were also considerably reduced. As opposed to paying a 
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percentage of total electricity costs in RE costs (with correspondingly higher 
costs for higher electricity use), in future RE costs are in the form of an additional 
lump-sum on gird tariffs (ibid: §48).  
 
As has been stated above, the GE-Act requires a two-thirds majority to be 
passed in parliament. The balance of power in the Austrian parliament in 2011 
was such that the governing social democratic party-peoples party coalition 
required the votes of at least one of the three opposition parties to pass the bill. 
Originally, negotiations began with the freedom party to reach an acceptable 
consensus. For reasons not specified, the freedom party then decided that it 
would not support the bill. The government turned their attention to the Alliance 
for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) to support the bill. The coalition thus formed was 
however, only marginally over the two-thirds majority required. According to the 
assessment of one of our interview partners, the coalition government was 
somewhat reluctant to rely only upon a very fragile majority with a partner, who 
could not necessarily be relied upon to vote collectively. As such, the decision 
was made to approach the Green Party. However the Green Party began 
negotiating upon the foundations laid by the BZÖ, and as such improved (from a 
RE perspective) the already quite progressive compromise. This was 
corroborated in the interviews, where the opinion was that to retain its reputation 
the Green Party must ensure that considerable improvements to the status quo 
are included in any legislation it supports (see for example Interview 3: 12). 
When asked which framework conditions were responsible for the considerable 
legislative changes in the GE-Act between 2006 and 2011, several reasons were 
mentioned such as the current salience of the theme (see Interview 5: 7), a 
change in minister, the missing of climate targets, the strength of the green 
energy lobby (see Interview 3: 10) or the events in Fukushima39 (see ibid, 
Interview 4: 14). In light of these changes and the Austrian targets for RE (of 
34% by 2020 from the EU RE directive), it was important for the government to 
make a statement, and in this context the ‘seal of approval’ of the Green Party 
seems to constitute such a statement, as is reflected in the comments made in 
                                            
39 The reference made here is to the catastrophe in the nuclear power plant of Fukushima Daiichi 
in Japan in March and the subsequent change in the European energy landscape following the 
decision of the German government to abandon nuclear power.  
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the interview with the representative of the Social Democratic Party (see 
Interview 8: 5).  
 
The above analysis shows that the particular conditions in 2011 – the necessity 
to translate Austria’s EU 2020 target of 34% RE to action, the change in the 
global and European energy landscape following Fukushima and the legislative 
involvement of the Green Party – were conducive to a progressive GE-Act.  
This situation was complemented by the pressure coming from the Austrian 
federal states. The respective interview partner was of the opinion that the 2012 
GE-Act was a big step forward due to the significant increase in funding, despite 
the fact that the federal states did their best to have the cap abolished, a concern 
voiced but ultimately faced with to much opposition from the social partners. 
Where the interview partner was adamant, was that the federal states had 
criticised the GE-Act in its various forms for several years, and that the 2012 act 
grew out of their criticism (see Interview 7: 3). 
 
As described above, some restrictive elements (from the position of RE 
production) remained in place, and these were highlighted in the interview 
conducted with the representative from the Federation of Industry. It was pointed 
out that the cap on funding (albeit a very high cap from the position of industry), 
declining tariffs, and innovative aspects such as diversified (different energy 
forms) support mechanisms remained in place. These aspects and the 
implementation of a cost restriction for energy intensive industry – termed a “life 
boat” – “are in place, because the Chamber of Commerce has contacts into the 
Ministry of Commerce” (Interview 5: 6).  
 
In summary, the GE-Act 2012 can be described as a considerable improvement 
for RE production. Clearly, actors opposing progressive RE policy were not as 
successful in implementing restrictive elements in the legislation as they were in 
2006 (described in the previous chapter). Both representatives from the 
Chamber of Labour and the Chamber of Commerce made reference to the 
Austrian Energy Strategy, describing it as a broad consensus and a good basis 
for developing RE production, a position both organisations would have been 
happy to support. The GE-Act 2012, both argued, went considerably further than 
the consensus position (see Interview 2: 14 & Interview 3: 11). The position of 
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the Chamber of Labour went further, describing the action of the “agricultural 
minister” as having bowed to the particular interests of the RE lobbies and 
having created “a bottomless [financial] pit for households” (Interview 2: 14).  
 
Many of the explicit conflicts visible in the debate around the amendment 2006 
were either alleviated or less visible in 2011. Based on the above analysis, it 
seems probable that representatives of industry and households were satisfied 
with the cost restrictions achieved for their respective clientele, and that the 
framework conditions and the political and societal pressure for a progressive 
GE-Act was such that resistance over and above the points mentioned were 
considered futile. 
Considerable efforts, however, did originally go into influencing the Austrian EU 
RE target (WIFO study referred to in chapter 6.1) on the one hand and on the 
other hand, many other conflicts and attempts to shape the discourse on RE – 
conflicts of a more general manner, not necessarily relating to specific 
provisions, but nonetheless clearly visible in the interviews conducted, are 
outlined below. 
 
5.2.3 Conflicts surrounding renewable energy in Austria 
Many of the conflicts, arguments employed and channels of influence pursued 
which were identified in the course of this research, do not relate to specific 
amendments of the GE-Act, but to the topic of RE in general. An issue which has 
always surfaced in the debate on RE is the question of costs. As put succinctly 
by the representative from the Federation of Industry: “Supporting renewable 
energy is right and is good. Where opinions differ, is the extent and the structure 
of the support” (Interview 5: 4). The fact that actors representing interests that 
have to carry these costs voice their opposition is to be expected. That actors 
who profit from particular policies voice their support seems equally obvious. 
Where conflicts become interesting is in the case of actors who at a first (and 
also second) glance seem to be ‘neutral’ with regard to the issue in question. 
One such actor referred to in the course of the interviews conducted, is the 
electricity market regulatory authority (E-Control), a body that is at least in theory 
supposed to be independent. According to one interview partner however, the E-
Control was often in favour of rather more restrictive policy (see Interview 7: 6) in 
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relation to RE production. As has been mentioned above, the regulatory authority 
was one of the actors demanding a cap on RE support in 2006, representing the 
interests of the members of several of the ‘alliance of payers’ (see ibid: 8). It 
seems rather odd that a regulator, who self-referentially states, that “to act even-
handedly in the interests of all market participants, regulators must be politically 
and financially independent.” (E-Control 2012), should represent certain 
interests. Some light is shed on this situation by the assessment that the 
regulatory authority and the Ministry of Commerce work together closely (see 
Interview 7: 9) and in turn by the fact that the Ministry is subject to certain 
constraints (see Interview 8: 2) by the clientele it serves (see Interview 4: 17).  
 
One conflict which has consistently accompanied the debate on RE in Austria, is 
the question over the types of energy to be supported, in particular biomass and 
biogas. On the one hand, industry representatives argue that the use of biomass 
for heat generation is an acceptable form of resource deployment, but that the 
use of biomass – particularly biomass which would otherwise be used by the 
Austrian paper industry - for power generation is wholly unacceptable (see 
Interview 5: 5f). A government representative interviewed referred to the use of 
biogas in the context of the GE-Act as a “botched” issue where “massive 
mistakes” were made (Interview 4: 4). On the other hand, representatives from 
the Chamber of Labour strictly oppose the use of resource based RE production 
in general. The use of resource based installations are referred to as 
“instruments deployed in the interests of agricultural politics” (Interview 2: 3) and 
that decisions regarding energy “production from biomass … are massively 
interest-led decisions” (ibid). In the course of the interview conducted, a concrete 
example was cited in relation to the tariff regulation for 2010. Following a report 
issued by the regulatory authority regarding tariffs, the “agricultural ministry” 
(ibid: 18) issued a counter-report. The two reports, it was added, contained very 
different figures concerning the proposed height of feed-in tariffs for biogas and 
the “report from the agricultural ministry clearly had the aim of raising the tariffs 
for biogas in the report of the regulatory authority” (ibid).  
The fact that reference is made to the “agricultural ministry” in this extract is also 
quite significant in this context. During the Peoples Party-Freedom Party coalition 
from 2000, the agricultural and environmental ministries were fused to create the 
BMLFUW (Federal Ministry for Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water). 
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Agriculture is traditionally a very conservative milieu in Austria, with the 
Conservative (Peoples) Party being strong in rural- and the Social Democratic 
Party strong in urban areas. As a result, social democratic, but also other (i.e. 
Green Party – see e.g. Parliament of the Republic of Austria 2011: 257 and 270) 
interests have often referred to the respective minister (traditionally from the 
Peoples Party) as agricultural minister, particularly in relation to environmental 
concerns (which thus, it is implied, carry little weight). Concrete reference was 
also made to this in the course of the interview in question (Interview 2: 3). This 
traditional conflict between social democratic and conservative/agricultural 
interests has thus been translated to environmental issues as well. In terms of 
the question of contrarianism in this context, the representatives form the 
Chamber of Labour explicitly made reference to the fact that their position 
against the use of biomass and biogas in RE production, has often led to them 
being seen as “green electricity hinderers” (ibid: 13 & 18). The arguments 
employed by both the Chamber of Labour and the Social Democratic Party 
(referring to it as an “ideological issue”) in this regard, are that food stuffs should 
be used as food and not for energy production (ibid & Interview 8: 6). This is 
clearly in opposition to the position from the ministry, whose representative 
clearly stated that the debate is not a question of either or and that there is “still 
enough wheat to make bread” (Interview 1: 20), whereas the common line of 
argument from traditionally ‘left-wing’ organisations translates to the slogan “food 
on the plate, not in the tank” (Interview 2: 18).  
 
Besides positions opposing resource dependent RE production, many other 
arguments are also voiced. A government representative interviewed made 
reference to arguments made by fossil based interests, trying to retain their place 
in the market, such as “power grid stability” which were deemed “rubbish” 
(Interview 1: 15). Industrial representatives present different positions again. On 
the one hand photovoltaic energy is referred to as “research” issue, not a 
“market penetration” issue, and that the support of photovoltaic energy in the 
context of the GE-Act is “Austro folklore” (Interview 5: 4). The strategy employed 
is clear – the seriousness of regulatory measures is questioned. 
 
In terms of the port of call for interest representation, all relevant interview 
partners clearly referred to the ministries and not, for example, parliament as 
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their point of access. Clearly reluctant to use the word lobbying, a government 
representative interviewed made reference to the “communication-work, to avoid 
the word lobbying” (Interview 4: 6) engaged in by interest groups in advance of 
the legislative process. Both representatives from the federal states and the 
Federation of Industry also identified the ministries prior to parliamentary action 
as the time when interest representation is crucial (see Interview 5: 7 & Interview 
7: 2). Another interview partner detailed this further, referring to the “many 
informal bodies” (Interview 2: 16) in the ministry where discussions are held prior 
to legislative initiative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 61
6 Interest Politics in Austria 
In the cases of the development of the NAPs and the 2006 amendment of the 
GE-Act in Austria, it has been demonstrated that actors opposed to progressive 
climate change policy were successful in influencing the policy making process.  
One of the research questions posed in this thesis asks why these actors have 
been quite so successful. Clearly there is some merit in the explanation offered 
by Colin Crouch that “large corporations have frequently outgrown the 
governance capacity of individual nation states. If they do not like the regulatory 
of fiscal regime in one country, they threaten to move to another, and 
increasingly states compete in their willingness to offer them favourable 
conditions, as they need the investment.” (Couch 2004: 29). However only the 
threat, implicit or explicit, of geographical relocation is surely not a sufficient 
explanation for the influence which has been demonstrated in the framework of 
this thesis and which is clearly exercised in other areas as well, as many 
companies are, for example, dependent in some way or another on Austria as a 
production base (e.g. reputation of quality of production in Austria, qualification of 
workers, cost of relocation etc.). If, as it is assumed here and was also 
corroborated within the interviews conducted, relocation is a fairly insignificant 
threat in relation to environmental policy in general and climate change policy in 
particular (see for example Interview 1: 2 or Interview 2: 8) then clearly certain 
other strategies are proving more successful and the state is more responsive to 
certain strategies then others (see chapter 1.3). An attempt at an explanation 
why the Austrian state reacts more favourably to some interests than others is 
offered below.  
 
Clearly one way in which influence over political parties and hence over the 
policy-making process is gained, is through party funding. Mayer (exploratory 
interview, see Annex I) discussed the example of the financing of political parties 
through interest representation organisations (i.e. by the Federation of Industry) 
and the influence this gives such organisations on decisions concerning party 
lists and the allocation of positions. These insights are corroborated by the 
analysis conducted by Sickinger (2009) who has written extensively on party 
financing in the Austrian political system.  
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However, these observations are surely not exclusive to the Austrian political 
system and can also be found in other countries as well. Somewhat more 
specific to Austria are the close-knit relationships between interest organisations 
and political parties, relationships which go far beyond mere financial 
cooperation. On the one hand, political parties but also ministries are dependent 
on expertise that can be found within companies and interest representation 
organisations. Expertise, however, when it comes from an interest organisation 
or company is never neutral (it could be argued that expertise is, per se never 
neutral, but that is another question). In fact, when interests are shrouded in the 
supposed objectivity or neutrality of ‘expert knowledge’ and not as the specific 
interests that they actually are, then they can be more easily integrated into the 
policy-making process (see chapter 4.2.1 for examples).  
Furthermore, Mayer identified specific ingrained mechanisms, such as the 
education of up-and-coming young politicians in the various chambers or 
federations – politicians who then go on to exercise political posts – and the 
function of companies in providing positions in boards of directors and interest 
representation organisations providing employment for politicians at the end of 
their political career (insights which are corroborated by Karlhofer 1999 and 
Tálos 2008).  
These particular (close) relationships and the rather inherent nature of interest 
representation organisations to the Austrian political system are historically 
contingent and can be explained in relation to the specific political developments 
in post World War II Austria. Before such an explanation is offered however, it is 
necessary to briefly outline the Austrian social partnership40, the development of 
which will then be described in the historical analysis which follows. 
 
 
 
                                            
40 Years of study and volume upon volume of academic literature have been devoted to the social 
partnership in Austria. As such, it is necessary to point out that the following analysis is very brief 
and superficial and is used to explain the empirical observations. It is not comprehensive nor is it 
meant to be. The analysis is however, based upon the writings of Emmerich Tálos, a scholar who 
has devoted much of his time to the study of interest politics in Austria, and as such is well 
informed. 
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6.1 Social Partnership 
Four of the major interest representation organisations in Austria form a part of 
what is called the social partnership: Chamber of Agriculture, Chamber of 
Labour, Chamber of Commerce and the Federation of Trade Unions. The social 
partnership is defined as “the pattern of interest representation and interest 
politics in Austria, between the umbrella organisations of the employers and the 
employees interest representation organisations, the government and the 
governmental ministries” (Tálos 2008: 10, translation from German original). 
Although the specific construction of the social partnership does not include the 
Federation of Industry (a more recent, but very powerful addition to the interest 
representation landscape in Austria), this organisation has, in many areas, 
enjoyed similar privileges (see ibid: 55). The pattern of decision-making within 
the framework of the social partnership is characterized by the privileged formal 
and informal involvement of these umbrella organisations in policy making and 
implementation on the one hand and on the level of coordination of divergent 
interests between the organisations on the other (see ibid: 10). A good example 
of such coordination can be found in the common position of the ‘alliance of 
payers’ (which included three of the four social partnership interest organisations 
and the Federation of Industry) during the 2006 amendment of the GE-Act (see 
chapter 5.2.1). Even if it cannot be described as completely unique, the social 
partnership in Austria is a very particular occurrence of corporatism, 
distinguished by its political weight and long-term stability (see ibid: 7).  
The power of interest representation organisations in Austria that is quite evident 
in the interdependence with political parties, parliament and government 
(described below), is compounded by the high level of both concentration and 
centralization within the respective organisational structures. In Austria, 
membership to either the Chamber of Labour as worker or employee or to the 
Chamber of Commerce as a company is compulsory and subject to a fee (see 
ibid: 37). As such, these organisations posses considerable weight both 
financially and in terms of sheer numbers of members represented.  
The power of the Federation of Trade Unions comes from centralization. The 
individual trade unions in Austria do not posses individual legal personality and 
are dependent upon the Federation for financial support. Consequentially both 
financial and representational power is in the hands of the federation, quite apart 
from the considerable total membership it enjoys (see ibid: 38f). 
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When compared internationally, the power of the various umbrella organisations 
in Austria is quite unique. In this context Lehmbruch has noted that if one were to 
measure representational monopoly by the lack of interest organisations 
competing against one another, then Austria would undoubtedly be the world 
leader (1985: 99 cit. in Tálos 2008: 40).  
 
Another source of considerable influence for the social partnership (and the 
Federation of Industry) is the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO). 
Two thirds of the institute’s funding comes from the social partners and the 
government, the other third coming from paid research (Karlhofer 2007: 394). 
The head of the board is traditionally the president of the Chamber of Commerce 
(ibid: 395). One of the public service roles the WIFO plays is through macro-
economic forecasts, which are often presented alongside those of the Institute 
for Advance Studies and the Austrian Central Bank. As such, the public 
perception (this is an assumption based upon experience and a knowledge of 
Austrian politics, economics and media, not corroborated by any data) of the 
WIFO is one of an independent expert. The WIFO itself states self-referentially: 
“WIFO operates on a non-profit basis and its scientific work is carried out 
independent of politics and business.”41 
The results of the study referred to in chapter 4.2.1 and other studies conducted 
over the past few years (see WIFO 2007, a study on total Austrian renewable 
energy capacity and WIFO 201142, a study on the Austrian contribution to the EU 
capacity to reach a unilateral 30% emissions reductions target, the latter of which 
stood in contradiction to a study conducted by the European Commission 2011) 
have however, always supported the argument or interest of the ordering party 
(Austrian interest organisations). 
The supposed (and self-proclaimed) independent expertise of the WIFO and the 
high standing it enjoys in Austria give it an image of both impartiality and respect, 
which in turn add weight to the results it publishes, results often in line with the 
(commissioned) interest of social partnership and related actors. 
 
                                            
41 http://www.wifo.ac.at/wwa/jsp/index.jsp?&fid=23910 (Accessed 21.04.2012) 
42 As NEWS magazine ironically noted, the WIFO study from 2011 “just so happened” to 
underpin the position of the ordering. (See 
http://www.news.at/articles/1115/11/294102/heimischer-zank-eu-klimaziele-wifo-studie-zufaellig-
auftraggeber  accessed: 13.04.2011) 
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6.2 Historical Development of Interest Politics in Austria 
What is quite unique to the Austrian political landscape is the post WW II 
reconstruction period and the particular cross-party, cross-interest effort at 
cooperation (cooperation made all the stronger by the will to move away from the 
fascist/Nazi elements particularly present in Austria in the 1930s and 1940s) 
which characterized this time, a time when a great majority of actors were 
working toward shared goals such as reconstruction, consolidating the economy, 
increasing production etc. (see Tálos 2008: 18).  
The consequence of this strong cooperation is that decisions are often taken, not 
on the basis of majorities, but on the basis of consensus. Furthermore, this has 
led to a tight, reciprocal permeation of Austrian state administration and 
bureaucracy and the major interest representation organisations (see ibid: 10).  
The development of the social partnership – as a multi-dimensional pattern of 
cooperation and accordance – which began in the years immediately following 
WW II, was completed in the 1960s where it had reached a standing in Austrian 
politics which would influence interest politics for decades to come (see ibid: 31) 
– and still does so today. Instrumental in these final developments toward the full 
institutionalization of the social partnership and symptomatic for the time which 
followed, were increasing conflicts in the government coalition. These conflicts 
led to an increase in de-facto out-sourcing of decision-making to the interest 
representation organisations (ibid).  
Although corporatist politics in Austria began in the context of negotiations on 
prices and wages, the institutionalisation of such decision-making grew 
considerably in the decades that followed. For the time period 1971 - 1987, a 
study showed that the interest organisations from the social partnership were 
represented in 223 advisory councils, commissions, committees, conferences, 
forums and working groups together with government and administrative public 
officials. This privileged embedding of the social partnership organisations has, 
on the whole, also been extended to the Federation of Industry (see ibid: 54f).  
Besides being institutionalized in the political process in the form of various 
different organisations as described above, the interdependence of interest 
representation organisations and the two major political parties (and as such 
parliament and government) goes considerably further. A good example of this is 
the fact that up until the 1980s, the presidents of the four social partnership 
interest organisations were also members of parliament. What is demonstrated 
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illustratively for the leadership of these organisations is valid throughout the 
organisational hierarchy. During the 1970s, over 50% of officials from these 
organisations had some – full- or part-time – function in the Austrian parliament 
(see ibid: 43). Ferdinand Karlhofer has gone so far as to say that the 
interweaving of interest organisation and party functions is a “component part of 
a historically developed political career model” (Karlhofer 1999: 31 cit. in Tálos 
2008: 44). This corresponds to the insights offered by Mayer in the exploratory 
interview conducted and mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. 
 
It seems important to note, particularly as the above is a historical and not a 
current analysis, that recent developments have seen changes to corporatism in 
Austria but this does not seem to have led to significant changes in either the 
power or influence of the interest organisations from the social partnership.  
On the one hand, Austria became a member of the European Union in 1995. As 
such much policy making has been transferred to Brussels and accordingly, the 
large interest representation organisations have also opened EU offices. 
Although this does mean a loss of terrain nationally, with many issues being 
decided on the European level, there are still several means of influencing the 
political process. As has been demonstrated in this thesis, the decisions which 
are still taken on a national level are subject to considerable ‘outside’ influence. 
With regard to decisions on the European level, the respective organisations 
have turned to influencing EU institutions directly or as part of European interest 
organisations or using existing contacts to individual politicians and ministries to 
influence the Austrian national position, which in turn has (some) influence on 
the European decision taken (see Tálos 2008: 92ff).  
Another more recent development was the election and subsequent two terms in 
government of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) (2000 - 2006, the first of which 
was cut short). Not being a part of the tight-knit system of ÖVP, SPÖ and the 
social partnership organisations, the FPÖ was quite keen on and successful in 
eroding the pattern of consensus politics in the framework of the social 
partnership, although this has again (at least in part) been reversed since the 
comeback of the SPÖ - ÖVP coalition (since 2006) (see ibid: 96). Even if these 
developments effected long-term changes in the pattern of decision-making, the 
influence of the individual organisations seems to have remained in place. 
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6.3 Consequences for Climate Policy 
Whilst the social partnership organisations were in conflict with one another – i.e. 
employers and employees organisations on social policy, or fiscal issues (this 
being the dominant corporatist pattern) – the social partnership often served in 
bringing about a compromise and a win-win situation. In the context of 
environmental policy, more specifically climate policy, these organisations often 
have the same interests (with the exception of the Chamber of Agriculture) – i.e. 
avoiding progressive policies as these tend to incur more short term costs for the 
members of the respective organisations – and as such the balanced 
mechanism of conflict resolution becomes an unbalanced forceful collection of 
interests trying to scale down ambition on climate and energy issues.  
This is particularly evident in Austria in the case of renewable energy, which may 
well also be connected to the fact that energy issues are dealt with by the 
Ministry of Commerce. As Tálos and Kittel have noted, “the involvement of the 
organisations in commercial/economic legislative processes is characterized that 
they, as privileged organisation have considerable influence on the subsequent 
law” (2001: 87). When the organisations work together, rather than opposing one 
another, as was the case with the 2006 GE-Act amendment, then their position is 
the one that is reflected in the decision-making process. 
Other issues which have negative consequences for climate policy are the 
larger, ‘strategic’ goals upon which the organisations of the social partnership 
concur, indeed where these organisations have often found common ground.  
On the macro-economic front, the social partnership organisations in Austria 
have found a consensus in pursuing “economic growth, security of employment, 
stabilization of purchasing power and securing competitiveness” for the economy 
as a whole, whilst simultaneously pushing their respective agendas (ibid: 42). 
The same can be also said for the dominant (party) political forces in the 
Austrian landscape, the SPÖ and ÖVP. Although pursuing opposing agendas on 
important issues of economic and social equality, these conflicts took and take 
place within the framework of a dominant, shared paradigm of growth and 
competition. Such a shared conception clearly has negative consequences for 
climate change issues as such policy incurs costs on economic actors, costs 
which are rejected on precisely these grounds: such costs hamper economic 
growth, endanger employment and lower the international competitiveness of 
Austrian companies (carbon leakage arguments).  
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Going back to the question posed - how the influence of the actors in question 
can be explained - and the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis in light of the 
influence which has been demonstrated and the analysis on the social 
partnership (above) then the contention voiced by Offe, Jessop and others and 
succinctly summarized by Wissen (see chapter 1.3), that the chances to “gain 
access to, and successfully articulate interests in” the terrain which is the 
(Austrian) state “are very unequally distributed” (2011: 243) seems more than 
justified. Not only is the access to the state terrain very unequal as a result of the 
embedded nature of the major interest organisations to the development and 
identity of the post WW II Austrian state, but the question of which issues end up 
on the agenda is also severely restricted. 
 
The 2006 amendment of the GE-Act is a very good example for unequal and 
highly restricted access to the state terrain. Despite considerable opposition from 
the Austrian Federal States (powerful actors themselves), the ‘alliance of payers’ 
was successful in getting practically all their demands into the final legal text. In 
light of the above, there are good, plausible reasons for this. On the one hand, 
the argumentation employed by the organisations fits with the shared conception 
and dominant paradigm established in Austria over the past decades. On the 
other hand, the fact that many of the major forces in Austrian politics – forces 
that generally form part of a delicate balance of power – were united on one side 
of the debate had the effect that no alternative perspective had any chance of 
being realized. 
 
Viewed in this light, the question of which method was to be adopted to 
determine the allocation of emissions certificates in the NAPs can also be seen 
differently. Although there were several different methods of allocation available 
and actors within the Ministry responsible for the relevant legislation (amongst 
others) were in favour of lower levels of allocation, the method of trend-allocation 
(which resulted in over-allocation) preferred by industry was selected. 
Accordingly the instrument of emissions trading has never worked in Austria, as 
on the whole there have always been more certificates allocated than actual 
emissions. As such, companies have not been put under any economic pressure 
to reform their energy use (the aim of the instrument) but have rather been 
receiving subsidies in the form of surplus certificates.  
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Again here, access to the state terrain is very unequal. On the one hand the 
question of allocation is of such a technical nature, that few actors are actually 
able to participate (demonstrated in the lack of NGO involvement in the issue, 
see chapter 4.2.1). On the other hand the actors who are directly or indirectly 
affected by the policies in question sit in the technical working groups where the 
policies are actually designed. As such, interests are voiced as expert 
knowledge, and interest driven policy dons the mask of evidence-based policy. 
The problem, as has been stated above, is when the balance of forces generally 
inherent to the social partnership is missing in such a constellation, as is the 
case here, then the possibility to articulate positions other than the dominant one 
become extremely limited and are almost bound to fail. 
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7 Conclusion 
In the course of this thesis, an attempt has been made to give an overview of the 
actors and the conflicts involved in Austrian climate policy. Two of the four pillars 
of the European climate and energy package were analysed on the level of 
Austrian national level implementation. The choice of actors analysed was based 
upon insights in the exploratory interview phase during which interest groups 
were clearly identified as the primary (non governmental) players in Austrian 
climate policy. The choice of actors was corroborated in the expert interviews, 
which were conducted concurrently to the primary document analysis. 
 
On the whole, conflicts centred on the distribution of costs of climate policy 
measures. In the context of emissions trading, these conflicts were related to the 
question of the method of allocation and the Business as Usual scenario that 
was developed as a result. The conflicts were carried out between ETS 
installations and their interest representatives on the one side and the Ministry of 
Environment (and others) on the other.  
The issue of renewable energy is considerably broader and as such, many more 
actors such as Austrian federal states but also NGOs (who were less involved in 
the emissions trading issue due to its highly complex and technical nature), 
renewable energy producers and interest groups and also other political parties 
(involved due to the two-thirds majority required in parliament for energy 
legislation) were involved. Again, conflicts centred on the distribution of costs 
with business and consumer interest groups lobbying for restricted levels of 
renewable energy support (as their clientele carry the costs) and NGOs, 
renewable energy interest groups and opposition parties lobbying for higher 
subsidies. However, conflicts went beyond mere questions of cost and 
encompassed issues such as the type of renewable energy to be supported. In 
this context, classical social-democratic - conservative divides became apparent, 
with ‘left-wing’ actors arguing that support for installations based upon biomass 
actually function as hidden subsidies for agricultural actors, the traditional 
clientele of the right. This divide was also broken up somewhat, with industrial 
interest representatives, typically on the conservative side of the political 
spectrum, embracing the arguments against biomass based installations as a 
means of lobbying against renewable energy. 
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It has been demonstrated that the channels of influence employed by the actors 
involved range from the formal, institutionalized methods – as was the case in 
determining the means of allocation for emissions trading – but also the more 
informal means – as was evident when it came to determining the actual volume 
of emissions to be allocated, where direct lobbying was employed (i.a. in the 
form of industry leaders telephoning the federal chancellor) and pressure 
applied. Different approaches were also observable in the case of renewable 
energy, with the alliance of payers actually preparing legal texts (the job of the 
ministry) on the informal side or the Green Party bargaining in parliament, for 
improved support measures to be included in the legislation on the formal side.  
 
In terms of the argumentation employed, it was made quite clear in chapter 2 
that typical arguments calling the science of climate change into question, as are 
voiced in the Anglo-American world, are not very common in Austria. As such, 
the analysis looked at the broader context of such argumentation and it was 
argued that these positions often have a different, underlying intention of 
sustaining the neo-liberal capitalist economy of which fossil fuel based 
production and consumption are an integral part. The aim is to uphold such 
patterns and keep alternatives to a minimum. The intended outcome of such 
positions is to spread the idea that there is no need for regulations. Accordingly, 
so it is argued, it does not actually matter whether arguments call the science of 
climate change into question, or question and try to undermine policy measures, 
if the aim is to keep regulations to a minimum, or off the agenda entirely, then the 
arguments are climate sceptical – or contrarian – in nature regardless of which 
form they take.  
Arguments questioning climate policy were found in varying forms in the policy-
making processes investigated. In the development of the national allocation 
plans, the argumentation identified did not so much question the policy as such, 
but argued for generous allocation, with the result that the effectiveness of the 
policy interventions were entirely undermined. Here the arguments focused on 
issues such as growth and the damage to competitiveness of Austrian 
companies (essentially carbon leakage arguments, classified by Tim Nuthall as 
contrarian, see Chapter 2). In the context of renewable energy, specifically the 
2006 GE-Act amendment, arguments for a decrease in support for renewables 
were based on the supposed consequences of such measures, which were 
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identified as decreasing investment, relocation of production, damage to 
competition and negative impacts on employment. Other arguments in terms of 
renewable energy, not attached to concrete policy measures as such, used the 
strategy of calling renewable energy technologies into question, i.e. describing 
photovoltaic, used on a global scale today, as an R & D rather than a market 
technology. 
 
Furthermore it has been demonstrated that actors employing such 
argumentation have been successful in influencing the policy making process. In 
the case of emissions trading this is clearly visible in terms of fairly constant 
over-allocation. The influence of the actors in question on the legal framework 
was also corroborated in the interviews conducted. The influence of actors 
employing contrarian arguments in renewable energy legislation is considerably 
clearer and also wholly evident in terms of actual renewables production (i.e. in 
the fact that no wind turbine was built in Austria for over three years following the 
2006 amendment and subsequent tariff adjustments).  
An attempt to explain why these actors have been successful with their agenda, 
despite multilateral, internationally, binding climate mitigation agreements and 
targets inscribed in European law was also made. Here the analysis focused on 
interest politics in Austria, the historically contingent nature of the power of 
interest groups and the resulting advantage in gaining access to the state and 
setting the agenda for such actors. 
 
In more recent developments, attempts to influence policy on the national level 
have been less successful. In terms of renewable energy, there seem to be a 
number of reasons for this. On the one hand, there is the simple fact that Austria 
is legally bound to reaching specific targets in the framework of the climate and 
energy package on the European level. On the other hand, the specific political 
and temporal constellation – the need on the part of the coalition government for 
Green Party votes to reach a majority and the window of opportunity created by 
events in Japan and the subsequent German (planned) withdrawal from nuclear 
energy – clearly played an important role. 
With emissions trading, actors on the national level are now confronted with the 
simple fact that policy-making has been relocated to the European level. In light 
of over-allocation in many countries in the first two trading periods, the decision 
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was made to centralise allocation on the European level. As such, attempts to 
influence policy making – clearly successful as post 2012 trading has already 
been watered down with benchmarking (meaning that many companies will 
continue to receive free certificates) – are now focused in Brussels. Only the 
future will tell how effective either the attempts to shape such policy to favour 
industry and power generation or the attempts to genuinely reduce EU emissions 
on a comprehensive scale have been successful.  
 
This research – having shown the influence of actors employing contrarian 
argumentation in the broad sense of the concept (defined in chapter 2) in 
influencing policy making in Austria – could be complemented by research in 
other (EU) countries and on the European level to determine whether similar 
patterns are occurring. 
Broadening the concept of climate scepticism to include more subtle, policy-
orientated arguments has clearly added to its benefit as an analytical category 
and contributed to the value-added of this research as a whole. 
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9 Annex 
9.1 Summary of exploratory interviews 
Interviews conducted: 
Erwin Mayer, Denkstatt   01. April 2011 
Bernhard Obermayr, Greenpeace 22. June 2011 
Christiane Brunner, Green Party  07. July 2011 
 
Actors 
 Parties 
 Federal ministries (particularly Environment and Commerce) 
 Federation of Industry 
 Chamber of Commerce 
 Chamber of Labour 
 Federation of Trade Unions 
 Large companies 
 
Material 
 Emission trading 
 Renewable Energy 
 EU emission reduction targets (2020 / 2050) 
 Distribution of Austria-internal reduction targets 
 Ecological tax reform 
 
Arguments 
 On a global level the USA and China have the highest level of 
emissions. Without consequential climate policy (e.g. binding emission 
reduction targets) by these countries, climate policy is futile. Rejection of 
EU reduction measures (e.g. raising the EU target from -20% to -30% by 
2020 in relation to 1990 levels). 
 Austria is an ecological pioneer (high proportion of renewable 
energy in electricity consumption and very energy-efficient companies) and 
as such should not be required to engage in comprehensive measures. 
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 Climate change mitigation is not cost effective (costs of renewable 
energy, carbon-leakage danger to economy, risk of international 
competition etc.). 
 
9.2 Classification of contrarian arguments in the project 
CONTRA 
Category   Example 
Trend sceptic  The planet is not warming 
Cause sceptic I  Warming is not anthropogenically caused 
Cause sceptic II Only a small fraction of warming is due to 
anthropogenic causes, state of science is not secured 
Effect sceptic Warming is of an anthropogenic nature, but warming 
is either not harmful or is positive 
Policy sceptic I  Mitigation is to expensive, only adaptation is sensible 
Policy sceptic II  Other problems are more urgent 
Policy sceptic III  Other actors must act first* 
*climate policy: 
 only makes sense on a local or global level 
 is only relevant for main emitters 
 only makes sense at low cost 
 
Adapted from: Formayer, Mayer, Schlatzer (2012): Classification. Not published. 
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9.3 Market Price of Electricity 
 
Fig. II: Market price for electricity (Euro/MWh) 
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Source: adopted from E-Control 2011 
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